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Abstract 
When firms expand to foreign markets, their entry strategies unfold. Traditionally, research on 
entry strategies has focused exclusively on firm- and industry-specific factors and largely 
ignored the context constituted by the institutions of the host country. The institutional context 
determines the “rules of the game” in any market, and includes both formal institutions such 
as laws and regulations and informal institutions such as norms and culture. With the 
increasing relevance of emerging markets, in which institutions differ significantly from 
developed economies, researchers are embracing the notion that firms adapt their entry 
strategies to the specific institutional context of the markets they are entering. 
This study responds to a lack of research addressing how institutions affect firms’ entry 
strategies across different institutional contexts. A case study of four Norwegian oil service 
firms is conducted, in which their entry strategies into Australia and Brazil – one developed 
and one emerging economy – are thoroughly investigated. 
The findings indicate significant differences between the institutional contexts of Australia 
and Brazil. Formal institutions such as laws, regulations and political systems are considered 
less familiar, more uncertain and less market-supporting in Brazil than in Australia, while 
informal institutions such as values and culture are considered more different from those in 
Norway. In Brazil, local content regulations, bureaucracy, political uncertainty and a 
fundamental protectionist sentiment are found to significantly affect entry strategies. 
The aspects of foreign market entry strategy considered in this study are (1) the rationale for 
market selection, (2) the choice of entry mode and (3) staffing and establishing foreign 
operations. Firms’ rationale for market selection is driven by factors such as market potential 
and the fit between firm resources and market characteristics, but institutional aspects such as 
regulations and political uncertainty are found to strongly affect the final decision of whether 
to enter. The choice of entry mode is similarly not found to be driven by institutional 
considerations, but rather by a desire for proximity to customers, the nature of the business 
and the size of foreign operations. However, the ultimate level of local presence is found to be 
strongly affected by institutional pressures, as in Brazil where a heavy local presence is 
demanded. Thus, the institutional context is found to affect entry strategies, not in isolation, 
but in interplay with other factors. 
The total costs and the time it takes to enter foreign markets are found to be significantly 
increased by bureaucracy and more complex “rules of the game” in Brazil. In total, Brazil is 
found more challenging to enter and the single, most clear, advice for entering the Brazilian 
market is to employ an all-or-nothing approach to achieve the necessary local presence. The 
findings further indicate that firms that deliberately take the institutional dimension into 
account when entering foreign markets are more likely to enter successfully.  
For researchers these findings support the notion that institutions cannot be disregarded when 
studying foreign market entry strategies, rather, a multi-theoretical approach is needed. For 
managers, the findings imply that firms should explicitly and deliberately consider the 
institutional context when entering foreign markets to make an informed decision about 
whether or not to enter and to appropriately adapt their entry strategies. 
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Sammendrag 
Når bedrifter utvider til utlandske markeder utfoldes deres inngangsstrategier. Tradisjonelt har 
forskning på inngangsstrategier utelukkende fokusert på bedrifts- og industrispesifikke 
faktorer og i stor grad oversett den konteksten som vertslandets institusjoner utgjør. Den 
institusjonelle konteksten bestemmer “spillets regler” i ethvert marked, og består av både 
formelle institusjoner som lover og regler og uformelle institusjoner som normer og kultur. I 
takt med den økende relevansen til fremvoksende markeder, hvor institusjonene avviker 
signifikant fra industriland, omfavner forskere ideen om at bedrifter tilpasser sine 
inngangsstrategier til den spesifikke institusjonelle konteksten i de markedene de entrer. 
Denne studien responderer på en mangel på forskning som adresserer hvordan institusjoner 
påvirker bedrifters inngangsstrategier i ulike institusjonelle kontekster. En case-studie av fire 
norske oljeserviceselskaper er gjennomført, der deres inngangsstrategier i Australia og Brasil 
– ett industriland og ett fremvoksende marked – er grundig undersøkt. 
Funnene indikerer signifikante forskjeller mellom de institusjonelle kontekstene i Australia og 
Brasil. Formelle institusjoner som lover, regler og politiske system er oppfattet som mindre 
kjente, mer usikre og mindre markedsstøttende i Brasil enn i Australia, mens uformelle 
institusjoner som verdier og kultur er oppfattet som mer ulikt Norge. I Brasil påvirkes 
inngangsstrategier av regler om lokalt innhold, byråkrati, politisk usikkerhet og en 
fundamentalt proteksjonistisk grunnholdning. 
De aspektene ved inngangsstrategier som er tatt i betraktning i denne studien er (1) 
bakgrunnen for valg av marked, (2) valg av inngangsmodus og (3) bemanning og etablering 
av den utlandske operasjonen. Bedrifters bakgrunn for valg av marked er drevet av faktorer 
som markedspotensial og pasningen mellom bedriftens ressurser og markedets karakteristika, 
men institusjonelle aspekter som reglement og politisk usikkerhet påvirker sterkt den endelige 
beslutningen om hvorvidt man entrer. Valget av inngangsmodus er på samme måte ikke drevet 
av institusjonelle vurderinger, men snarere av ønsket om nærhet til kundene, virksomhetens 
natur og størrelsen på den utlandske operasjonen. Funnene indikerer imidlertid at det endelige 
nivået av lokal tilstedeværelse er sterkt påvirket av institusjonelle krav, som i Brasil der både 
formelle og uformelle institusjonelle krav forventninger krever en tung lokal tilstedeværelse. I 
sum, indikerer funnene derfor at den institusjonelle konteksten påvirker inngangsstrategiene, 
ikke i isolasjon, men i samspill med andre faktorer. 
Funnene indikerer at totalkostnaden og tiden det tar å entre utlandske markeder øker 
signifikant som følge av byråkrati og mer komplekse ”spillets regler” i Brasil. Totalt sett, 
indikerer funnene at Brasil er mer krevende å entre. Funnene indikerer at det tydeligste rådet 
når man entrer det brasilianske markedet er å ha en alt-eller-ingenting-tilnærming for å oppnå 
den nødvendige tilstedeværelsen lokalt. Funnene indikerer videre at bedrifter som bevisst tar 
den institusjonelle dimensjonen i betraktning når de entrer utlandske markeder har en bedre 
sjanse for en vellykket inngang. 
For forskere støtter disse funnene ideen om at institusjoner ikke kan ignoreres når man 
studerer inngangsstrategier i utlandske markeder, snarere kreves en flerteoretisk tilnærming. 
For bedriftsledere innebærer funnene at bedrifter må uttrykkelig og bevisst ta den 
institusjonelle konteksten i betraktning når de entrer utlandske markeder for å kunne foreta en 
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informert beslutning om hvorvidt en velger å entre og for hensiktsmessig å tilpasse sine 
inngangsstrategier. 
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1 Introduction 
What determines foreign market entry strategies? This question has remained high on the 
research agendas of international business scholars over the past few decades. The majority of 
research addressing this question has been based on transaction-cost theory and resource-
based theory, indicating that foreign market entry strategies are determined by factors specific 
to the firm and the industry it operates in (Yiu and Makino, 2002, Meyer et al., 2009). In 
recent years, however, increased attention has been paid to the role of the context of market 
entry, constituted by the host countries’ institutions (Meyer, 2001, Peng et al., 2008). The 
institutional context includes both formal institutions such as laws and regulations and 
informal institutions such as norms and culture (North, 1990). Collectively these institutions 
constitute the “rules of the game” in a society, thereby constraining and enabling firm 
behavior and foreign market entry strategies. 
The importance of the institutional context or institutional environment
1
 has been elevated by 
the increased interest in emerging markets, in which institutions differ significantly from 
those of developed economies (Hoskisson et al., 2000, Wright et al., 2005). As emerging 
markets are increasingly opened up through economic liberalization, and developed 
economies are becoming saturated and highly competitive with diminishing long-term 
potential, firms look to emerging economies for less competitive markets, increasing 
disposable incomes and large populations of young consumers (Sakarya et al., 2007). This 
vast potential, however, comes at a cost due to challenges posed by the institutional contexts 
of emerging markets, which are often less familiar to developed country firms, weaker and 
less market-supporting and less stable (Arnold and Quelch, 1998). According to Hoskisson et 
al. (2000), there is increasing appreciation that institutions shape the strategy and performance 
of firms in emerging markets, and according to Wright et al. (2005) institutional theory seems 
to be the most dominant theoretical perspective within strategy research in emerging markets. 
According to Peng et al. (2008), the proposition that institutions matter is hardly novel or 
controversial. What is interesting is how institutions matter. According to Powell (1996) 
scholars must “tackle the harder and more interesting issues of how they matter, under what 
circumstances, to what extent, and in what ways” (Peng et al., 2009). Several researchers 
encourage future studies to vary the institutional contexts in order to address such how 
questions regarding the influence of institutions on firm strategies (Peng, 2002, Meyer et al., 
2009) This study responds to this lack of research by in-depth and qualitatively investigating 
and comparing the foreign market entry strategies of the same firms entering both emerging 
and developed economy contexts. This approach, which to the best of the author’s knowledge 
has not been taken by any prior research, enables an appropriate examination of how the 
different institutional contexts influence entry strategies. 
To guide the efforts of this study, the following research question has been developed: 
How do the differing institutional contexts of developed and emerging economies 
affect firms’ foreign market entry strategies?  
                                                 
1
 The terms “institutional context” and “institutional environment” are used interchangeably in this thesis. 
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To address this research question, the study takes form of a case study and draws its cases 
from the Norwegian oil service industry and the foreign market contexts of Australia and 
Brazil – one developed and one emerging economy. Catering to the needs of offshore oil and 
gas production in Norway over the past 40 years, the Norwegian oil service industry has 
developed technology, products and services that are demanded in oil and gas regions across 
the globe. The industry’s share of international sales is steadily increasing (Rystad Energy, 
2012) as more and more firms are looking to foreign markets for further growth. Indeed, the 
oil service industry has become Norway’s largest export industry, excluding crude oil and 
natural gas itself (Jakobsen et al., 2012). Australia and Brazil are two of the largest and fastest 
growing offshore markets in the world and constitute two of the most important growth 
regions for Norwegian oil service firms (Rystad Energy, 2012). 
Thus, studying Norwegian oil service firms entering Australia and Brazil is highly relevant 
and provides a suitable “laboratory” for a case study of how foreign market entry strategies 
are affected by the differing institutional contexts of emerging and developed economies. 
More specifically, the study is an in-depth and qualitative investigation of the entry strategies 
of four Norwegian case firms that have entered or tried to enter both the Australian and the 
Brazilian oil service markets. To complement the cases an industry expert has been 
interviewed. The study takes an institution-based view and examines how the differing 
institutional contexts of Australia and Brazil affect the reasoning and decision-making of 
entrant firms. The study takes a broad view on foreign market entry strategy and investigates 
(1) the rationale for market selection, (2) the choice of entry mode, and (3) staffing and 
establishing foreign operations, in addition to addressing implications for the successfulness 
of market entry. 
1.1 Main goal of the study 
The goal of this study is twofold. Firstly, by taking an in-depth and qualitative approach, as 
opposed to much of the research in the field, and by investigating entry strategies across 
different institutional contexts, it hopes to reveal novel and interesting insights into how 
entrant firms are affected by the institutional contexts of the countries they are entering. 
Qualitative case studies capture, not only the decisions made by the firms, but also their 
underlying reasoning and considerations. This is hoped to enable a deeper understanding of 
how entrant firms are influenced by institutions and how this differs between entering 
emerging and developed economies, thereby responding to a void in current research and 
exploring a new approach. 
Secondly, the study seeks to extract knowledge and learn from the case firms’ specific market 
entry processes in Australia and Brazil. These two markets are highly relevant as growth 
regions for the Norwegian oil service industry, and the experiences and lessons learned from 
the cases are in themselves hoped to be interesting and valuable, both with regard to entering 
Australia and Brazil specifically and with regard to entering developed and emerging markets 
in general. 
1.2 Limitations of scope 
This study focuses on firms that originate and have their headquarters in a developed country. 
Research within internationalization and foreign market entry strategy often focuses on a 
specific subset of firms such as Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) or 
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Multinational Corporations (MNCs). This study does not make such a distinction, to avoid 
further restricting the already limited number of suitable case firms. An important 
methodological aim of the study is to investigate the same case firms, in the same industry, 
marketing the same products in both countries, to allow the best possible conditions for 
comparing the influence of institutions between the two countries. There are a very limited 
number of Norwegian oil service firms that have entered or tried to enter both Australia and 
Brazil. Since firms and their key managers are also highly difficult to get access to, the 
decision was made not to further restrict the set of potential case firms by only focusing on 
SMEs or MNCs. Furthermore, since this is a qualitative study, potential biases that would 
arise due to firm size were considered to be appropriately dealt with on a case-by-case basis. 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The rest of this thesis is structured as depicted in Figure 1. First, the theoretical background 
for the study is presented in section 2 building primarily on three theoretical bases, namely (1) 
foreign market entry strategy, (2) emerging versus developed economies and (3) institutional 
theory. These are ultimately combined into a theoretical framework for the study. Next, the 
research methodology of this study is presented and ultimately evaluated in section 3. Section 
4 presents the empirical findings in a straight-forward and objective manner with separate 
case descriptions of each of the four case firms, in addition to a summary of the interview 
with an industry expert. Section 5 provides a cross-case analysis, highlighting the similarities, 
differences and patterns across the four case firms, and complements this with insight from 
the industry expert. Then section 6 returns to the theoretical framework discussing each 
theoretical proposition in light of the empirical findings. This section further presents 
implications of this study for theory, for managers and for policy makers. Lastly, it discusses 
the limitations of this study and provides directions for future research. Finally, section 7 
presents the conclusions of this study. 
 
Figure 1 – Structure of the thesis 
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2 Theoretical background 
To address the research question of how the differing institutional contexts of developed and 
emerging economies affect firms’ foreign market entry strategies, this study is founded on 
three theoretical bases. These are (1) foreign market entry strategy, (2) emerging versus 
developed economies and (3) institutional theory. The purpose of this section is to introduce 
and define these concepts and review related academic theory to be able to develop a 
theoretical framework including propositions which will guide the data collection, analysis 
and discussion of this study. 
The first subsection clarifies and defines the aspects of foreign market entry strategy that are 
covered by this study. The second subsection focuses on how emerging economies differ from 
developed economies. The third subsection provides an introduction to the theoretical 
perspectives most commonly employed within foreign market entry research. The fourth 
subsection reviews academic literature on institutional theory and its application to foreign 
market entry research, and develops a set of theoretical propositions. The final subsection 
depicts the theoretical framework constituted by the theoretical propositions. 
2.1 Foreign Market Entry Strategy 
As firms increasingly engage in international business and increasingly depend on 
international markets for survival and growth, the importance of the strategic reasoning and 
decision-making related to internationalization is ever growing. At the very heart of any 
international strategy lies the selection of what markets to enter and the entry mode for each 
market (Koch, 2001). 
The majority of internationalization literature focuses on the choice of entry mode (Sakarya et 
al., 2007), which has been described as a frontier issue in international marketing (Anderson 
and Gatignon, 1986). Indeed, certain researchers use the terms “entry mode” and “entry 
strategy” interchangeably, e.g. Cavusgil et al. (2011) and Andersen and Buvik (2002), while 
Root (1987) defines entry strategy as a range of decisions, and entry mode as one of them. An 
aim of this study is to have a broad view on foreign market entry strategy, and not merely 
analyze the choice of entry mode. Following the definition by Mintzberg (1978) of strategy as 
“a pattern in a stream of decisions”, this study views foreign market entry strategy as the 
stream of decisions that leads to entry into a foreign market. It is hypothesized that an in-
depth and qualitative assessment will uncover important strategic differences across emerging 
and developed markets even though the actual entry mode choice is the same in each market. 
This is in line with the research of Crick and Jones (2000), who similarly argue that 
internationalization decisions are made in an integrated manner, and treats the entry mode 
choice merely as one part of the process. 
Since this is an in-depth and qualitative case study, in addition to studying market selection 
and the entry mode choice, it was further desired to shed light on and learn from firms’ 
experiences with setting up business operations in the foreign market. This aspect is less 
concise and restricted, and more open to capture various firm experiences related to foreign 
market entry, beyond the initial decisions of market selection and entry mode. 
Thus, this study focuses on (1) the rationale for market selection, (2) the choice of entry mode 
and (3) staffing and establishing foreign operations as depicted in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 – Aspects of foreign market entry strategy covered in this study 
 
2.1.1 Rationale for market selection 
Commonly described as one of the most critical decisions in international business 
(Cherunilam, 2007, Andersen and Strandskov, 1997), market selection is concerned with 
identifying and screening potential country-markets and ultimately selecting which markets to 
enter. 
The market selection process is usually composed of stages, such as preliminary screening, 
identification/in-depth screening and final selection (Koch, 2001). At each stage markets are 
evaluated based on a range of selection criteria such as market size and growth, availability 
and cost of production factors, level of economic development, country environment, psychic 
distance, market-based factors, competition, information and market knowledge (Sakarya et 
al., 2007). More generally, such selection criteria can thus be external or internal to the firm, 
they can be market- or industry-based, host country institution-based or firm resource-based. 
Despite presenting a range of different selection criteria, Cavusgil et al. (2011) ultimately 
states that “the best markets are large and fast-growing”, emphasizing the importance of 
market-based factors. The factors considered and the reasoning leading to market selection 
constitute the firm’s rationale for market selection. 
2.1.2 Choice of entry mode 
Perhaps the most widely studied concept within the foreign market entry process is the choice 
of entry mode. Root (1983) defines foreign market entry mode as “an institutional 
arrangement that makes possible the entry of a firm’s products, technology, human skills, 
management, or other resources into a foreign country”. Anderson and Gatignon (1986) refers 
to the entry mode as the “governance structure” of the foreign operations. 
Choosing an entry mode involves several trade-offs, and each available entry mode has its 
advantages and disadvantages. Firms seek to choose an entry mode that yields the desired 
amount of control over operations in the foreign country, while at the same time adhering to 
the firm’s resource constraints and limiting the risk assumed. According to Root (1987) “to 
gain greater control, the company will have to commit more resources to foreign markets and 
thereby assume greater market and political risks.” Anderson and Gatignon (1986) thus 
proposes that the choice of entry mode is a function of  this trade-off between control and 
resource commitment, while Cavusgil et al. (2011), in addition includes the dimensions of 
flexibility and risk. 
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Several different classifications of the generic entry modes available to the firm have been 
proposed. In a broad sense they can be classified as either low-, medium- or high-control 
modes (Anderson and Gatignon, 1986, Cavusgil et al., 2011) or as either export, contractual 
or investment/equity modes (Root, 1987). Based on 15 more specific entry modes presented 
by Root (1987), Johnson and Tellis (2008) proposes the following five generic entry modes: 
 Export: a firm’s sales of goods/services produced in the home market and sold in the 
host nation, directly or through an entity in the host nation such as a sales agent or 
distributor. 
 License and Franchise: A formal permission or right offered to a firm or agent 
located in a host nation to use a home firm’s proprietary technology or other 
knowledge resources in return for payment. 
 Alliance: Agreement and collaboration between a firm in the home market with a firm 
located in a host nation to share activities in the host nation. 
 Joint Venture: Shared ownership of an entity located in a host nation by two partners 
– one located in the home nation and the other located in the host nation. 
 Wholly Owned Subsidiary: Complete ownership of an (acquired or developed) entity 
located in a host nation by a firm located in the home nation to manufacture or 
perform value addition or sell goods/services in the host nation. 
Figure 3 depicts these entry modes according to the trade-off dimensions of Cavusgil et al. 
(2011), namely control, resource commitment, flexibility and risk.  
 
Figure 3 – Entry modes and trade-off dimensions (adapted from Johnson and Tellis 
(2008) and Cavusgil et al. (2011)) 
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2.1.3 Staffing and establishing foreign operations 
Given that the chosen entry mode involves a type of subsidiary in the foreign market, either 
jointly or wholly owned, the entrant firm must establish foreign business operations. This 
entails a range of activities such as designing and staffing an organization, hiring or buying 
offices or facilities, contracting external advisors, accounting and auditing firms and other 
business partners, obtaining necessary licenses, certificates and approvals required to operate 
in the host country etc. This third aspect of foreign market entry strategy is concerned with the 
challenges, costs and decisions related to establishing foreign operations. It is a less concise 
and restricted aspect than the two former, and is intended to be open enough to capture a wide 
range of issues firms are exposed to when setting up business operations in the particular 
foreign countries considered in this study. 
One important strategic component of the staffing strategy, which will be addressed in this 
study, is the choice between employing parent country nationals (PCNs) or expatriates, host 
country nationals (HCNs) and third country nationals (TCNs), corresponding to the 
categorization of Cavusgil et al. (2011). According to Gaur et al. (2007) this staffing decision 
has implications for control, coordination and knowledge management between the parent 
firm and the subsidiary, as well as affecting subsidiary responsiveness and legitimacy in the 
host country. 
Furthermore, this part of the market entry process is intended to address the total costs and the 
time it takes to set up business operations in the foreign country. 
2.2 How emerging economies differ from developed economies 
Recent years have accommodated an increased interest in emerging economies, or emerging 
markets, from businesses, governments and scholars alike. The underlying reasons for their 
newfound attractiveness are a combination of factors including their economic liberalization, 
the saturation of developed country-markets, the emergence of an identifiable target market 
with increasing disposable income and the marketing reach of the internet (Arnold and 
Quelch, 1998). There are however significant costs, challenges and risks associated with 
entering and operating in emerging economies, such as less familiar, less developed and less 
stable market-supporting institutional environments. 
Cavusgil et al. (2011) divides the countries of the world into three categories, namely 
advanced economies, developing economies and emerging markets. According to Cavusgil et 
al. (2011) advanced economies are “post-industrialized countries characterized by high per-
capita income, highly competitive industries, and well-developed commercial infrastructure”. 
Developing economies are “low-income countries characterized by limited industrialization 
and stagnant economies”. Emerging markets are “former developing economies that have 
achieved substantial industrialization, modernization, and rapid economic growth since the 
1980s”. This thesis focuses on the former and the latter, which will be termed developed and 
emerging economies, respectively. 
Even though no commonly accepted definition of emerging economies exists, three 
characteristics often underlie various definitions, namely that emerging economies have (1) a 
low level of economic development, usually expressed by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita, (2) a high rate of economic growth, usually expressed by the GDP growth rate and (3) 
a system of market governance approaching a free-market system (Arnold and Quelch, 1998). 
Emerging economies are mainly found in South and East Asia, Latin America, Eastern 
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Europe, Southern Africa and the Middle East (Cavusgil et al., 2011). Table 1 presents a list of 
countries which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) refers to as emerging economies. The 
four largest emerging economies, often referred to as the BRIC countries, are Brazil, Russia, 
India and China. 
 Argentina  Indonesia  Poland 
 Brazil  Latvia  Romania 
 Bulgaria  Lithuania  Russia 
 Chile  Malaysia  South Africa 
 China  Mexico  Thailand 
 Estonia  Pakistan  Turkey 
 Hungary  Peru  Ukraine 
 India  Philippines  Venezuela 
Table 1 – Emerging economies (International Monetary Fund, 2012) 
Emerging economies represent a vast potential for firms looking to expand into foreign 
markets. Collectively they constitute close to 60 percent of the world’s population and more 
than 40 percent of world GDP (Cavusgil et al., 2011). Moreover, while developed economies’ 
GDP grew by 3.9 percent annually between 2000 and 2010, the BRIC countries’ GDP grew 
by 10.4 percent, adjusted for purchasing power parity (International Monetary Fund, 2012). 
Cavusgil et al. (2011) emphasizes the importance of emerging economies as target markets, 
manufacturing bases and sourcing destinations for multinational firms world-wide. The latter 
two, for reasons such as low-cost but high-quality labor and in some cases access to raw 
materials and natural resources. According to Arnold and Quelch (1998), however, in recent 
years firms increasingly look to emerging economies as target markets due to their long-term 
revenue-generating potential. As diminishing long-term potential is available in saturated and 
highly competitive developed economies firms look to emerging economies, which are 
associated with less competitive markets, increasing disposable incomes, large populations of 
young consumers, and they are increasingly opened up through economic liberalization 
(Sakarya et al., 2007).  
However, the vast potential of emerging economies comes at a cost. According to Arnold and 
Quelch (1998) firms operating in emerging economies face “a range of unfamiliar conditions 
and problems”. There is a lack of basic infrastructure that is taken for granted in developed 
economies, such as market data, distribution systems and communication channels. Moreover, 
legal frameworks and their enforcement are often weaker, including protection of property 
rights (Hoskisson et al., 2000). When such market-supporting institutions are weak, firms 
cannot engage in market transactions without incurring undue costs or risks, as the institutions 
fail to ensure effective markets (Meyer et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, due to their rapid economic growth and political reform, emerging economies 
have inherently less economic and political stability. Arnold and Quelch (1998) argue that 
there is a lack of regulatory discipline and that business regulations can change frequently and 
unpredictably. There is also a higher risk of public intervention or expropriation (Demirbaga 
et al., 2007), implying increased uncertainty and risk about the future for firms entering and 
operating in emerging economies. 
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In addition, national and local governments and other regulatory bodies are often more 
influential in emerging markets than in developed-country market systems (Arnold and 
Quelch, 1998). There is generally a higher level of bureaucracy and excessive requirements 
for licenses, approvals and paperwork, which increase time-consumption and costs for firms. 
Furthermore, certain countries have policies favoring local firms (Cavusgil et al., 2011). 
Even though countries have established formal frameworks to support effective market 
interaction, informal norms and culture may be lagging behind (Dikova and Witteloostuijn, 
2007), causing informal networks and relationships to be fundamentally important.  
In summary, the institutional environments of emerging economies are generally different and 
less familiar to firms from developed countries, they are less developed and weaker in 
supporting market transactions and less stable and predictable. In addition authorities are 
often more influential, more bureaucratic and favor local firms. 
Due to differences and challenges such as these, firms must adapt their strategies when 
entering and operating in emerging markets. Furthermore, even though a general description 
is given here, this is by no means applicable to all emerging economies alike. Rather, each 
specific emerging economy has its particularities and requires a customized approach from 
internationalizing firms (Arnold and Quelch, 1998). 
2.3 Introduction to theoretical perspectives on foreign market entry strategy 
To address the research question of how the differing institutional contexts of developed and 
emerging economies affect firms’ foreign market entry strategies, this study takes an 
institutional theory perspective on foreign market entry strategy. However, even though this 
thesis focuses on the influence of the institutional context, it is by no means claimed that 
institutions are the only influence on market entry strategy. Rather, understanding how 
institutions influence firm strategies also involves knowledge of how institutions influence 
strategy compared to and in relation to other influences. 
Having an adequate understanding of the other most commonly employed theoretical 
perspectives on foreign market entry research is therefore important. This subsection gives a 
brief introduction to the most common theoretical perspectives on foreign market entry, while 
institutional theory is more thoroughly discussed in the next subsection. 
As pointed out in 2.1, literature on foreign market entry strategy often focuses on the choice 
of entry mode, while this study takes a broader view on entry strategy. However, the 
theoretical perspectives most commonly used to analyze the choice of entry mode are 
considered to be relevant to research on foreign market entry strategy in general. 
In their comprehensive literature review of the research field, Brouthers and Hennart (2007) 
found that the most commonly employed theoretical perspectives on the entry mode choice 
are transaction cost theory, the resource-based view, institutional theory and Dunning’s 
eclectic framework. The latter is not a theory itself, but rather a framework combining factors 
from the other three perspectives (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007). This framework will 
therefore not be further described here. Industry-based factors affecting firm strategy is also 
often referred to in this thesis. This is not a theoretical perspective often employed in the 
particular domain of foreign market entry strategies, so it is not further presented here, but it 
is an influential perspective on firm strategy based on the forces of competition within an 
industry, strongly influenced by the research of Porter (1980). 
10 
 
Transaction cost theory 
Among the four perspectives, transaction cost theory is the most frequently used theoretical 
perspective (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007). Transaction cost theory is concerned with the 
costs of transacting in the market, and states that the boundaries of firms are determined by 
firms selecting the governance structure that minimizes the transaction costs of carrying out 
its activities (Williamson, 1985). The theory is based on two behavioral assumptions, namely 
bounded rationality and opportunism. According to Williamson (1985) three factors influence 
transaction costs and thereby the choice of governance structure, namely asset specificity, 
internal and external uncertainty and task frequency. 
According to Anderson and Gatignon (1986) the entry mode decision is a trade-off between 
control and resource commitment. When the transaction costs of operating in a particular 
foreign market are low, firms utilize the market. In other words, the default entry mode under 
the transaction cost perspective is a low resource commitment mode, such as exporting. When 
transaction costs of operating in the foreign market are higher, the need for control is higher 
and firms must engage in an entry mode that involves higher commitment of resources, such 
as establishing a subsidiary abroad. 
Resource-based view 
The resource-based view, also termed knowledge-based or organizational capabilities view, 
focuses on the unique bundle of resources and capabilities possessed by the firm. Barney 
(1991) classifies firm resources into financial resources, physical resources, human resources 
and organizational capital, and states that resources that are valuable, rare and imperfectly 
imitable form a basis for competitive advantages. Firms thus seek to possess, develop or 
acquire such resources in order to exploit competitive advantages in the market. 
With regard to foreign market entry the resource-based view is therefore concerned with how 
firms can use foreign markets to exploit their unique resources, or develop or acquire new 
resource-based advantages (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007). According to Brouthers and 
Hennart (2007) international experience is one such resource that has been found to influence 
foreign market entry decisions. This is in tune with the internationalization process or stages 
model proposed by Johanson and Vahlne (1977), perhaps the most influential effort to develop 
a model of the internationalization of a firm and the chain of operational modes in a specific 
country (Björkman and Eklund, 1996). This model states that firms, as they become 
increasingly experienced with foreign markets, gradually enter more distant markets and, as 
they gain knowledge about a particular foreign market, gradually increase their resource 
commitment in each market. 
2.4 Institutional theory – Developing the theoretical propositions 
As is evident from the above discussion, research on foreign market entry has traditionally 
focused on how entry strategies are influenced by factors specific to the firm and the industry 
it operates in, taking the effects of country-specific contextual factors as constant or less 
import (Yiu and Makino, 2002). Though insightful, these perspectives can be criticized for 
ignoring the context in which firms compete (Peng et al., 2008). Recently, researches have 
increasingly argued that international business research should focus more on the context 
constituted by institutions (Meyer, 2001, Peng et al., 2008, Yiu and Makino, 2002). 
Institutional theory focuses on the role of the political, social and economic systems 
surrounding firms in shaping their behavior (Wright et al., 2005). This study takes an 
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institutional theory perspective, addressing the question of how the differing institutional 
contexts of developed and emerging economies affect firms’ foreign market entry strategies. 
Institutions are defined by North (1990) as “the humanly devised constraints that structure 
political, economic and social interaction” or more informally “the rules of the game in a 
society”. The major role of institutions is thereby to reduce uncertainty and provide meaning 
to the members of a society. Institutions consist of both formal and informal institutions which 
combine to constrain the choices available to individuals and organizations. Formal 
institutions refer to political, legal and economic systems and include constitutions, laws, 
regulations, property rights etc., while informal institutions refer to social norms and values of 
individuals and include sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions etc. (North, 1991). Institutions 
change and evolve over time, but although formal rules can change overnight, informal 
institutions are often deeply rooted and more resistant to change (North, 1990). 
The importance of institutions in shaping firm behavior has been asserted and emphasized by 
both economists and sociologists. While North (1991) represents the economic version of 
institutional theory, Scott (1995) represents the sociological version and defines institutions as 
“cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and 
meaning to social behavior.” Proponents of the economic perspective on institutional theory 
view the firm as a rational economic actor that seeks to maximize economic efficiency by 
adapting to the institutional framework. The sociological strand of institutional theory, on the 
other hand, states that the firm seeks to attain legitimacy by adapting to the institutional 
framework, and that it is constrained by bounded rationality in doing so (Peng, 2002). In line 
with researchers such as Oliver (1997), Peng (2002) and Peng et al. (2009), this study takes an 
integrative approach, drawing from both strands of institutional literature, and does not further 
highlight differences between the two. 
Institutional theory is closely related to transaction costs. North (1990) argues that transaction 
costs consist of the costs of measuring the value of the exchanged good and the costs of 
protecting rights and policing and enforcing agreements. “These measurement and 
enforcement costs are the sources of social, political and economic institutions” (North, 
1990). According to Meyer (2001) "institutions reduce transaction costs by reducing 
uncertainty and establishing a stable structure to facilitate interactions." Researchers have thus 
begun to extend transaction cost theory, by including the institutional context (Brouthers, 
2002).  
Peng et al. (2009) argue that an institution-based view on strategic management has emerged, 
as researchers have increasingly realized that “institutions are more than background 
conditions”. Furthermore, the authors argue that the institution-based view is “the third leg of 
the strategy tripod”, the other two being the industry-based and resource-based views. An 
institution-based view on strategy “focuses on the dynamic interaction between institutions 
and organizations, and considers strategic choices as the outcome of such interaction” (Peng 
et al., 2008). In other words, strategic choices are not only driven by industry conditions and 
firm capabilities, but are also a reflection of the institutional environments firms operate in 
(Peng et al., 2008). 
With regard to foreign market entry strategy, institutional theory research suggests that firms 
are influenced by the institutional environment when making market entry decisions, because 
the institutional environment of the host country constitute the “rules of the game” by which 
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firms participate in the particular market. According to Brouthers and Hennart (2007) research 
in this area has primarily focused on host country institutional environments or differences 
between home and host countries.  Meyer (2001) studied the effects of host country 
institutions on the choice of entry mode, and concluded that firms select a coordination 
mechanism that fit the environment. More specifically, the stronger and further developed the 
institutional environment of the host country is, the more likely entrant firms are to choose a 
high-control entry mode such as a wholly-owned subsidiary. The influence of institutions on 
the entry mode choice is confirmed by Yiu and Makino (2002), who found that regulatory, 
normative and cognitive dimensions of the institutional environment (referring to the above 
definition by Scott (1995)) all have a direct effect on the entry mode choice. With regard to 
market selection, Whitelock and Jobber (2004) found that the five factors that most 
significantly influence the decision of whether or not to enter a country are “developed 
economy, good market information, unsympathetic government attitude, geocultural/political 
similarity and attractive market”. The former four of these factors can be interpreted as 
institutionally based factors, indicating that the institutional environment of the host country 
also strongly influence the rationale for market selection. Gaur et al. (2007) adopted an 
institutional perspective in their study of how host country environments influence subsidiary 
staffing strategies, and found empirically that firms rely more on expatriates in institutionally 
distant environments. 
In summary the above discussion predicts that all aspects of foreign market entry strategy 
considered in this study (i.e. rationale for market selection, choice of entry mode and staffing 
and establishing foreign operations) are affected by the institutional environment of the host 
country. 
This leads to the first theoretical proposition of this study: 
Proposition 1 (P1): 
The institutional context of the host country affects firms’ reasoning and decision-
making with respect to foreign market entry i.e. firms’ foreign market entry strategies. 
According to Peng (2002) the reason for the former lack of attention given to the institutional 
context is that most strategy research has been performed in Western, developed countries 
where the differences in institutional contexts are small, and similar market-based “rules of 
the game” are taken for granted across nations. Peng (2002) holds that this research has 
struggled to separate the institutional effect on firm strategy and performance, and emphasizes 
the importance of varying institutional contexts when studying the effects of institutions on 
business strategy. 
The deficiencies of research assuming away institutions as “background conditions” becomes 
more striking when probing into emerging economies, since the institutions of emerging 
economies differ significantly from those in developed economies (Peng et al., 2008). There is 
increasing appreciation that institutions shape the strategy and performance of firms in 
emerging markets (Hoskisson et al., 2000), and according to Wright et al. (2005) the 
institution-based perspective seems to be the most dominant perspective within strategy 
research in emerging markets. Meyer et al. (2009) argue that the level of development of an 
emerging economy’s market-supporting institutions directly influences firms’ entry strategies.  
This leads to the next two theoretical proposition of this study: 
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Proposition 2 (P2): 
The effects of the host country’s institutional environment on foreign market entry 
strategies are more significant in emerging economies than in developed economies. 
 
Proposition 3 (P3): 
Due to the challenges posed by the host country’s institutional context firms find 
foreign market entry more challenging in emerging economies than in developed 
economies. 
 
Some studies have also addressed the implications of the host country’s institutional 
environment on the performance of foreign affiliates (i.e. joint ventures and subsidiaries) 
(Makino et al., 2004, Chan et al., 2008). These studies indicate that the performance 
variations of foreign affiliates are higher in poorly developed institutional environments, but 
also indicate a negative relationship between the performance level of foreign affiliates and 
the level of institutional development of the host country. Research in this area is limited, 
particularly research addressing the implications of entrant firms’ responsiveness to the 
institutional dimension in their entry strategies. 
This leads to the next theoretical proposition of this study: 
Proposition 4 (P4): 
Firms that deliberately take the institutional context of the host country into account in 
their reasoning and decision-making with respect to foreign market entry are more 
likely to perceive the market entry process as successful. 
According to Peng et al. (2008), the proposition that institutions matter is hardly novel or 
controversial. What is interesting is how institutions matter. There seems to be a lack of 
qualitative research addressing such how questions regarding the effects of institutions on 
firm strategy, and in particular foreign market entry strategy. Indeed, Meyer et al. (2009) 
requests further research addressing the “specific aspects of institutions that explain variations 
of business strategies” between countries, and further how “institutions shape the 
development of new subsidiaries subsequent to initial entry”. 
This study responds to this lack of research by in-depth and qualitatively addressing how 
institutions matter, and not limiting the research to the entry mode choice, but also addressing 
pre-entry rationale for market selection and post-entry staffing and establishing foreign 
operations, both in emerging and developed economy contexts. Furthermore, institutional 
theory researchers emphasize that institutions are not the only source of influence on firm 
strategy and entry decisions, and advocate the need to address the “interactive effects of 
institutional factors on other decision-making criteria” (Brouthers and Hennart, 2007), such as 
transaction-cost and resource-based factors. This study is therefore not blind to other 
influences, but rather seeks to address how institutions matter compared to and in conjunction 
to other influences. 
  
14 
 
This leads to the final theoretical proposition of this study: 
Proposition 5 (P5): 
The effects of the host country’s institutional context on foreign market entry may be of 
lesser or greater significance than other influences, such as transaction-cost-based, 
industry-based and resource-based influences, and may moderate or enhance such 
other influences. 
 
2.5 Theoretical framework 
Collectively the theoretical propositions developed in the previous subsection form the 
theoretical framework of this study, as depicted in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 – Theoretical framework 
It is important to emphasize that these propositions are not merely meant to be confirmed or 
denied, as is often the case in quantitative research. Rather, as this is a qualitative research, 
these propositions are meant to guide the focus of the research, which ultimately seeks to 
uncover the qualitative explanations to how and why these propositions are true or not. 
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3 Methodology 
This section presents the methodology used to address the research question of this study. 
First, the overall research design is presented. Then the selection of cases, which are taken 
from the oil service industry, is explained. Data collection and analysis procedures are 
explained, before the research methodology is evaluated. 
3.1 Research design 
The research question of this study is concerned with how the differing institutional contexts 
of developed and emerging economies affect firms’ foreign market entry strategies. In order to 
address this research question and arrive at a deep understanding on the matter, the main idea 
behind the research design is to investigate market entry into different institutional contexts, 
namely a developed economy context and an emerging economy context, and examine how 
the entry strategies differ. 
This is accomplished through a case study of four firms’ entry strategies in both Australia and 
Brazil – one developed and one emerging economy. It relies to a large extent on in-depth 
interviews to investigate the influence of host country institutions on the entry strategies of 
the firms. It then analyzes the similarities and differences across the case firms and countries, 
and discusses the empirical findings with respect to the theoretical framework presented in the 
previous section. 
The multiple-case study to a large extent follows the recommendations of Yin (2009). 
According to Yin (2009) a case study is preferable when the study (1) seeks to examine 
“how” and “why” questions, (2) requires little control over behavioral events, and (3) focuses 
on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context. Since this study examines how the 
different institutional contexts of developed and emerging economies affect market entry 
strategies, the first and third criteria are clearly fulfilled. The study addresses the 
considerations and decisions of the case firms and does not seek to influence their behavior, 
hence the second criterion is also fulfilled.  
The emphasis on context is particularly important in distinguishing the case study from other 
research designs (Yin, 2009). Since the main focus of this study is in fact the influence of the 
context itself, namely the institutional context of the host country, the case study was deemed 
suitable for the purpose. 
The individual cases are firms entering both Australia and Brazil – one developed and one 
emerging economy, and the unit of analysis is the foreign market entry strategy in each of the 
two countries. A multiple-case approach is chosen to increase the robustness of the study. 
According to Yin (2009) it is critical that multiple-case studies are designed based on a 
replication logic, rather than a sampling logic which is appropriate for surveys which seek to 
determine the prevalence or frequency of a particular phenomenon. A replication logic implies 
that each case is carefully selected so that it either predicts similar results (a literal replication) 
or contrasting results but for anticipated reasons (a theoretical replication). If all cases either 
literally or theoretically replicate the original theory, the study provides substantial support of 
the theory. 
This study explores how the differing institutional environments of developed and emerging 
economies affect the entry strategies of entrant firms. As evident from the theoretical 
propositions developed in the previous section, it predicts significant differences in the degree 
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of influence by institutions between developed and emerging markets. It further predicts these 
differences to be found for all firms. In other words, the study seeks theoretical replication 
between the entry processes in the developed and the emerging economy, and literal 
replication between each case firm. 
In addition to the cases, an independent industry expert was interviewed as part of the 
empirical research of this study. The expert works for a global management consulting firm, 
he is an expert on the oil and gas industry and has substantial experience from supporting 
firms with market entry into both Australia and Brazil. While managers of the case firms have 
an inherent bias in that they are internal to the case firms which may affect their 
interpretations and representations of events, an independent industry expert brings an 
external perspective, not associates with any one firm but based on substantial experience 
from working with several firms entering Australia and Brazil. The inclusion of this expert 
interview is intended to complement and strengthen the empirical foundation of this study. 
However, the study remains a case study and the main empirical research and the main focus 
of the analysis and discussion are the case firms. The expert interview merely complements 
the cases and brings an external perspective. 
3.2 Selection of the cases 
A goal for the research design was to be able to vary the country-specific institutional contexts 
while holding firm-, industry- and product-specific factors to a large degree equal. This is 
accomplished by selecting case firms that have market entry experience from both one 
developed and one emerging economy. In other words, the study seeks to investigate the same 
case firm, in the same industry, marketing the same products in both countries. Holding as 
many factors as possible equal between the entry strategies studied in each country, is 
expected to provide suitable conditions under which to investigate how the differing 
institutional environments of developed and emerging economies affect foreign market entry 
strategies.  
3.2.1 “Case laboratory” – Norwegian Oil Service firms entering Australia and Brazil 
The Norwegian oil service industry
2
 is selected as a “case laboratory” for this study and all 
case firms are Norwegian oil service firms. This industry is particularly interesting to study 
from a foreign market entry perspective since an increasing number of Norwegian oil service 
firms are venturing abroad and because firms are faced with a limited number of world-wide 
offshore markets to select from, several of which being non-developed countries. Two of most 
important growth regions for Norwegian oil service firms, Australia and Brazil, are 
appropriate examples of one developed and one emerging economy, while both countries are 
somewhat equally distant in terms of geography. Thus, this industry and these two countries 
were considered a suitable “laboratory” for studying how the differing institutional contexts 
of developed and emerging economies affect firms’ entry strategies. 
The Norwegian oil service industry is based around offshore activities on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf, which until today has been the largest offshore oil and gas market in the 
world. Catering to the needs of offshore oil and gas production in Norway, the industry has 
developed technology, expertise, products and services that are demanded in oil and gas 
                                                 
2
 The Norwegian oil service industry is defined as Norwegian registered firms (including their Norwegian and 
foreign subsidiaries) that supplies oil and gas related products and services to the upstream oil and gas industry, 
either directly to oil and gas operators or indirectly to other suppliers (Rystad Energy, 2012). 
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regions across the globe, particularly offshore. While the majority share (58 %) of the 
industry’s revenues still come from the Norwegian market, the share of international sales is 
steadily increasing (Rystad Energy, 2012), indicating that more and more companies are 
looking to foreign markets for further growth. Indeed, the oil service industry has become 
Norway’s largest export industry, excluding crude oil and natural gas itself (Jakobsen et al., 
2012). 
Internationalization in the offshore industry has its particularities due to the fact that there are 
a limited number of offshore oil and gas regions in the world, and the internationalization path 
is thus limited to these regions. Besides Norway, the largest offshore markets in the world are 
Brazil, the United States of America (USA), the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia. Thus 
beyond the “close” UK and USA, firms are forced to look to Brazil and Australia for further 
growth. Indeed, Brazil and Australia are two of the largest and fastest growing offshore 
markets in the world and constitute two of the most important growth regions for Norwegian 
oil service firms in the years to come (Rystad Energy, 2012). 
However, these two countries are significantly different when it comes to market entry for 
foreign companies. This is evident from the Ease of Doing Business Index created by the 
World Bank, in which Australia and Brazil rank 10
th
 and 130
th
, respectively (The World Bank, 
2012). Brazil is an emerging economy, while Australia is a developed economy. Both are 
nonetheless prime targets of the entry strategies of Norwegian oil service firms. 
Due to the current relevance of these two markets from an industry perspective, and their 
relevance as prime examples of one developed and one emerging economy, studying market 
entry into these two countries was considered to enable a suitable investigation of the 
influence of different institutional contexts on entry strategies. Furthermore, due to the current 
relevance of these two countries in the oil service industry, it was believed be possible to 
identify firms that have pursued both these country-markets adequately recent and proximate 
in time. It was therefore decided that this study would target case firms that have market entry 
experience from both Australia and Brazil, and investigate the entry strategies in both 
markets. 
3.2.2 Identification and selection of case firms 
In order to identify such case firms, Intsok
3
 was contacted and inquired for lists of Norwegian 
oil service firms operating in Australia and Brazil, and one list for each of these two countries 
was obtained. Conversations with Intsok also revealed a list of companies that participated in 
the Brazil Entry Program – a support program implemented in 2011 and 2012 by Intsok and 
Innvovation Norway to assist Norwegian firms in entering the Brazilian market. Though 
several companies that participated in this program had not yet entered the Brazilian market, 
these companies were considered particularly interesting to study because they had worked 
deliberately with market entry issues in Brazil, very recent in time and with assistance of 
Norwegian support organizations. Therefore these three lists – firms operating in Australia, 
firms operating in Brazil and firms participating in the Brazil Entry Program – constituted the 
                                                 
3
 Intsok – Norwegian Oil and gas partners – is an organization established by the Norwegian oil and gas industry 
and the Norwegian Government to promote the Norwegian offshore industry abroad and provide market 
information to its partners (Intsok, 2013). According to Tore More, Intsok’s local advisor in Australia, Intsok’s 
partners include 90 % of Norwegian oil and gas related companies with international operations. 
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basis for identification of case firms. Comparing these three lists resulted in a list of 15 
companies which were all considered qualified as case firms for this study. 
It was considered critical to get access to the key managers who were involved in the market 
entry processes in these countries. Preferably this study would interview managers who were 
involved in both market entry processes, and would be able to directly compare his or her 
experiences between the countries. If that was not plausible, the study would interview one 
manager involved in each country and do the comparisons separately. Due to the difficulty in 
reaching and receiving an audience with such key managers, who are known to have 
extremely busy schedules, the further narrowing down of the list of firms was driven by the 
likelihood of getting such access. The personal contact network of the author of this study was 
therefore examined to identify potential connections to any of the 15 firms, which was 
believed to increase the odds of getting the firms to participate in the study. This lead to the 
author being introduced to key managers of three firms, namely Aker Solutions Brazil, 
Kongsberg Oil & Gas Technologies and Eureka Pumps. All three managers agreed to 
participate in the study. The author further used the websites of the remaining companies on 
the list to identify key managers and call them directly inquiring about their willingness to 
partake in the study. NorSea Group was contacted this way and agreed to participate. Lastly, 
since there was no manager available in Aker Solutions with sufficient experience from both 
Australia and Brazil, a key manager in Australia was also contacted directly and he agreed to 
participate. 
With three case firms whose managers were involved in both market entry processes in 
Australia and Brazil, and one case firm from which one key manager from each country had 
agreed to participate, the group of case firms was considered appropriate within the time and 
resource limits of this study. 
Aker Solutions have been established in both Australia and Brazil for several years, rather 
than recently having entered these markets. Being the largest Norwegian oil service firm with 
substantial insight into and experiences from the institutional contexts of these two countries, 
the gains of including Aker Solutions in the study were considered significant and the 
decision was made to carry out the interviews with the managers, and then subsequently 
evaluate whether the interviews provided relevant and valuable insight to this study. Indeed, 
despite the focus of the interviews being shifted from foreign market entry to foreign 
operations, the insight and experiences shared by the managers of Aker Solutions are 
considered highly relevant and valuable, and Aker Solutions is maintained as a case firm of 
this study. 
3.3 Data collection 
One advantage of the case study is that it allows for the use of several sources of data (Yin, 
2009). This study also depends on several sources of data, such as documents, presentations, 
annual reports, company websites and third-party websites. However, the primary sources of 
data are semi-structured interviews with key managers of the case firms. According to Yin 
(2009) interviews are one of the most important sources of case study information. 
Prior to the interviews 
Three different interview guides were developed prior to the interviews – one for parent 
company managers involved in both countries, one for foreign subsidiary managers and one 
for the industry expert. These can be found in the appendix of this thesis. The interviews were 
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intended to be semi-structured and open-ended, and the interviewees were encouraged to 
speak freely and emphasize aspects considered important. Based on the theoretical framework 
developed in the previous section, the interview guides contain five main elements: (1) 
Company background, (2) Rationale for market selection, (3) Choice of entry mode, (4) 
Staffing and establishing foreign operations and (5) Perceived successfulness of market entry. 
In the case of Aker Solutions, because this firm has been established in both Australia and 
Brazil for several years, these five main elements were modified into (1) Company 
background, (2) Rationale for operating in Australia and Brazil, (3) Entry mode of foreign 
business, (4) Staffing and operating foreign business and (5) Perceived successfulness of 
foreign business. 
Prior to all interviews, company websites including annual reports and presentations were 
used to gather background information about the firms and to understand their offerings and 
markets. This was done for two main reasons. The first reason was simply for the interviewer 
to prepare for the interview. The better the interviewer knows the particular company, its 
offerings, its international experience and its involvements in these two particular markets, the 
better suited he or she is to instantly respond to and act on the responses of the interviewee, 
ask follow-up questions, guide the direction and manage the focus of the interview. The 
second reason was to avoid spending too much interview time on the background of the 
company, since this information to a large degree is publicly available from company 
websites, annual reports and presentations. Since the time of these key managers is very 
limited, it was desirable to spend as much time as possible discussing market entry strategies 
and host country institutions. 
In addition to company websites, the website proff.no – a publicly available database with 
financial data on all Norwegian companies – was used to gather financial background data 
about the case firms. 
Within each element of the interview guide, the specific questions were designed in a thought-
through way. First, questions were asked openly, inviting the interviewee to focus on the 
aspects he or she considered most important, in order to get an unbiased response. Then, 
follow-up questions were asked to pinpoint the aspects which are the main focus of this study, 
namely the influence of the institutional environments. This style of questioning enabled the 
interviewer to capture both the “other influences” and how these affect entry strategies in 
relation to institutional influences (addressed by Proposition 5), and focus on the influence of 
institutions which is the main focus of the study. 
Prior to the interviews, all interviewees were given a short description of the subject of the 
interview. This merely included the research question and the above mentioned five main 
elements of the interview. This was intended to allow the interviewees to prepare mentally for 
the interview, perhaps recalling some relevant memories and experiences prior to the 
interview. Other than that, no preparations were deemed necessary from the side of the 
interviewees prior to the interviews. 
During the interviews 
All interviews were conducted using either Skype or telephone. This was necessary due to the 
author being located in Sydney, Australia, at the time of the study and due to the very limited 
and highly valued time of the managers who were interviewed. When Skype was used, part of 
20 
 
the interview was done with video conferencing. All interviews were conducted in 
Norwegian, and lasted between one and two hours. 
With the consent of the interviewees, all interviews were recorded with audio recording 
equipment. This allowed the interviewer to be free from taking notes during the interview, and 
he could rather direct his attention to asking follow-up questions and managing the focus of 
the interview. Recording also enables accurate rendition of the interview. 
The interviewer commenced all the interviews with a short introduction to the study including 
the research topic, the structure of the interview and a short definition of formal and informal 
institutions. The latter aspect was deemed important to ensure that the interviewer and the 
interviewee had a clear and common understanding of the concepts that were about to be 
discussed. 
Despite the interview guides having a clear structure based on the above mentioned five main 
elements, the interviews took several leaps from this structure and topics were to some degree 
discussed in a more random order directed by the responses of the interviewees. Ultimately, 
however, all interviews sufficiently covered the main elements of the study. 
However, in the cases of NorSea Group and Eureka Pumps, which have not yet completed 
market entry into both Australia and Brazil, not all questions regarding the final two elements 
of the interview guide were relevant. Therefore, adaptations were made during the interview 
when considered appropriate. 
3.4 Analysis and discussion 
When the interviews were conducted, analysis could begin. According to Yin (2009) this is 
one of the least developed and most difficult aspects of doing case studies. Although no 
defined procedure for analyzing case study data exists, Yin (2009) presents a range of general 
strategies and analytical techniques. This study made use of the general analytical strategies 
of developing a framework for case descriptions and relying on theoretical propositions, and 
employed the analytical techniques of cross-case analysis and pattern-matching. The analysis 
relies on the theoretical propositions both indirectly, as the propositions direct attention and 
influence what aspects that are considered relevant, and directly, as the propositions are 
ultimately addressed and discussed. 
Case descriptions 
As a starting point for the analysis, a framework for describing each case was developed, 
following the same structure as the interviews i.e. containing the five main elements (1) 
Company background, (2) Rationale for market selection, (3) Choice of entry mode, (4) 
Staffing and establishing foreign operations and (5) Perceived successfulness of market entry. 
Such a structured case description is a deliberate strategy for organizing a case study (Yin, 
2009). 
Using the recorded audio, all interviews were fully transcribed after being conducted. 
Producing the full transcripts required close and systematic listening and subsequently 
allowed for careful reading and in-depth analysis of each interview. In this process, relevant 
aspects were highlighted and quotes were extracted from the interviews. Based on the above 
framework, a description of each case firm was written. This description is highly based on 
the interviews, follows the structure of the interviews and directly references and quotes the 
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interviews. These case descriptions were sent to the interviewees when they were written, 
which gave the interviewees a chance to review the information presented and confirm that it 
was correct. This was particularly important because the interviews were conducted in 
Norwegian, while the case descriptions were written in English. However, only very minor 
changes were made to one of the case descriptions as a result of this process. Section 0 is 
made up of these case descriptions. The full transcripts from the interviews are not disclosed 
with this thesis due to the privacy of the case firms. The same procedure was followed for the 
expert interview. Instead of a case description, a summary of the interview was written and 
sent to the industry expert, who requested a few minor corrections to wording the summary. 
Cross-case analysis 
The next step of the research was the cross-case synthesis or cross-case analysis. According to 
Yin (2009) this is an analytical technique which aggregates findings across a series of 
individual studies. This process began with a careful read-through of the case descriptions, 
while looking for and highlighting similarities and differences and overall patterns across case 
firms. The full transcripts were directly enquired when necessary. This process led to a written 
cross-case analysis, which is presented in section 0. The cross-case analysis largely follows 
the same structure as the interviews and the case descriptions, and similarities, differences and 
patterns found across all case firms are interpreted and presented. The analysis is 
complemented by the findings from the interview with the industry expert. 
Discussion based on pattern-matching 
Based on the cross-case analysis, the study returned to the theoretical framework to directly 
address and discuss the theoretical propositions in light of the empirical findings. The 
technique used for this is called pattern-matching, which according to Yin (2009) is one of the 
most desirable techniques to use for case study analysis. Pattern-matching involves comparing 
an empirically based pattern with a predicted one. In this study, the predicted pattern is the set 
of theoretical propositions predicted by the theory reviewed in section 2, and the empirical 
pattern is the results of the cross-case analysis. The pattern-matching technique was carried 
out by each of the five theoretical propositions being analyzed and discussed based on the 
findings resulting from the cross-case analysis. This ultimately led to the discussion presented 
in section 0, from which implications for theory, managers and policy-makers as well as the 
conclusions of this study are drawn. 
3.5 Evaluation of the research methodology 
In this subsection, the quality of the methodology employed for this study is evaluated. 
According to Yin (2009) four criteria are commonly applied when establishing the quality of 
any empirical social research, namely construct validity, internal validity, external validity and 
reliability. In the following, the quality of this research methodology is evaluated with respect 
to these four criteria. 
Construct validity 
Yin (2009) defines construct validity as “identifying correct operational measures for the 
concepts being studied.” In this study, which is a case study relying heavily on open-ended 
interviews, a critical aspect of the construct validity is whether the interviewer and the 
interviewee have a clear and common understanding of the concepts being discussed and 
whether the interviewer correctly interprets the responses of the interviewee. Two concepts 
were considered particularly vulnerable to ambiguity, namely institutions and entry mode. To 
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address this, as part of the introduction to each interview, the concept of institutions was 
defined, including a distinction between formal and informal institutions, and corresponding 
examples. The concept of entry mode was explained in plain words and a common 
classification of the different entry modes was given, when this aspect was discussed in the 
interview. 
Another area where this study is particularly vulnerable is the use of both the Norwegian and 
the English language. The interviews were conducted in Norwegian, while the thesis is in 
English. This can potentially lead to weak construct validity if concepts discussed in 
Norwegian are not appropriately translated to English. A measure taken to deal with both this 
and the former issue was to send the English case description to the interviewees for approval 
before further analyzing. By getting the English case description approved by the interviewee, 
potential inaccuracies related to both concept clarity and translation were largely eliminated. 
Having key informants review a draft of the case study report is described by Yin (2009) as an 
available tactic to increase construct validity. 
A third area of potentially weak construct validity is the fact that this study relies heavily on 
the interviews and that interviews were only conducted with one representative from each 
firm (or two in the case of Aker Solutions). The events discussed in the interviews are 
therefore subject to the personal interpretation of the interviewees, and not perfectly 
representative of the firm. Yin (2009) presents using multiple sources of evidence as a tactic 
to achieve high construct validity. This study has also strived to do so, and other sources of 
data such as websites, annual reports and presentations have been used to confirm certain 
information from the interviews. However, the fact that only one representative of each firm 
was interviewed remains a potential weakness, even though these were key managers 
involved in the processes studied. Ultimately this becomes a trade-off between the scope and 
scale of the study and the achieved construct validity. 
Overall, given the time and resource constraints of this study, the construct validity is 
considered satisfactory. 
Internal validity 
Internal validity is defined as “seeking to establish a causal relationship, whereby certain 
conditions are believed to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious 
relationships” (Yin, 2009). The causality relationships investigated in this study are primarily 
the influence of institutions on different aspects of market entry strategy, and how firms’ focus 
on institutions affect the perceived successfulness of market entry. A potential pitfall of this 
research design would be if the author gave himself too much freedom to interpret causal 
relationships as opposed to causal relationships being described directly by the interviewees. 
The author has strived to achieve the latter, as most findings are directly derived from quotes 
of the interviewees. 
An important contribution to the internal validity of this study is the inclusion of “other 
influences” such as industry-, transaction-cost- and resource-based factors in the theoretical 
framework, despite this study being based on the institution-based perspective. This allows 
the study to better capture other explanations for firm’s reasoning and decision-making than 
the institutional environment. Yin (2009) argues that addressing such rival explanations is an 
important way to increase internal validity. Furthermore, as described above, the questioning 
in the interviews was deliberately designed to be initially open so that the actual influences 
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that the interviewee first thought of were discussed first, rather than the interviewer putting 
words into the interviewee’s mouth. Then, follow-up questions were asked to focus more on 
the institutional issues. 
Another technique used in this study, which according to Yin (2009) increases internal 
validity, is pattern-matching. Comparing empirical patterns with predicted patterns (i.e. the 
theoretical propositions), and establishing that the patterns coincide strengthens the findings 
with respect to causal relationships. 
Even though measures have been taken in the research design to establish internal validity, 
certain vulnerabilities remain. The study relies heavily on the interviews and therefore the 
ability of the interviewees to correctly assess the causal relationships. There is certainly a risk 
that interviewees can misinterpret cause and effect issues related to the market entry processes 
discussed. However, within the time and resource constraints of this study, the internal 
validity is considered satisfactory. 
External validity 
External validity refers to defining the extent and conditions under which the study’s findings 
can be generalized (Yin, 2009). This study focuses on how the entry strategies of firms are 
affected by host country institutions and how this compares between emerging and developed 
economies. To investigate this, a case study is used where firms are selected from the 
Norwegian oil service industry and the host countries selected are Australia and Brazil – one 
representative of developed economies and one representative of emerging economies. This 
research design therefore has obvious limitations in terms of generalizability or external 
validity. The research question of this study is of a general nature focusing on firms in 
emerging and developed economies. However, this is merely a case study of four Norwegian 
oil service firms in Brazil and Australia. The findings of this case study are therefore not 
claimed to be true for all firms in all emerging and developed economies. However, the 
findings and the analysis and discussion may provide valuable insight also in the general 
sense. Similarly, since only four case firms are investigated, the findings cannot be claimed 
true for all Norwegian oil service firms in Australia and Brazil, even though they are arguably 
generalizable to a larger extent in this specific case than in the general sense, due to 
particularities of the oil service industry and the two countries considered. It is a strength of 
this study that the specific case studied, namely Norwegian oil service firms entering 
Australia and Brazil is a highly relevant domain in itself. Furthermore, the inclusion of an 
interview with an industry expert, not associates with any one case firm, brings an external 
perspective and strengthens the external validity of the study. 
According to Yin (2009) in multiple-case studies the use of replication logic is important to 
increase external validity. A replication logic implies that each case is carefully selected so 
that it either predicts similar results (a literal replication) or contrasting results but for 
anticipated reasons (a theoretical replication). If all cases either literally or theoretically 
replicate the original theory, the study provides substantial support of the theory. As evident 
from the theoretical propositions, this study predicts significant differences in the degree of 
influence by institutions between developed and emerging markets. It further predicts these 
differences to be found for all firms. In other words, the study seeks theoretical replication 
between the entry processes in the developed and the emerging economy, and literal 
replication between each case firm. 
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Being an in-depth and qualitative case study, this study relies on what Yin (2009) refers to as 
analytical generalization rather than statistical generalization, and is therefore more concerned 
with identifying, generating and investigating theoretical insight and relationships than 
generalizing findings to a larger population. 
Reliability 
Reliability involves demonstrating that the operations of a study can be repeated with the 
same results (Yin, 2009). An obvious challenge to qualitative case studies like this one is that 
they rely heavily on interpretation, both by the informant and by the researcher.  The 
informants have interpreted the events being studied and the researcher interprets the 
statements of the informants. However, properly documenting the procedures carried out in 
the study certainly increases reliability. 
The procedures leading to the findings of this study are the selection of the cases, the data 
collection including preparing for and conducting interviews, the review of case descriptions 
by the interviewees, the cross-case analysis and the discussion. All these procedures are 
thoroughly documented in this section of the thesis, in order to increase the reliability of the 
study. Several measures have been taken to increase reliability. The empirical findings are 
presented in a straight-forward manner, before being analyzed and discussed separately. The 
fact that the interviews were recorded and transcribed also contributes to reliability. The 
interview guides used are included in the appendix. Including the full transcripts would have 
increased reliability even further, but at the cost of reduced privacy for the case firms. 
In accordance with the advice of Yin (2009) a case study database was developed for the 
study, in which all data collected was maintained in a structured and systematic manner. 
Despite the measures taken, the subjectivity of both the researcher and the informant presents 
a potential vulnerability of the study with respect to reliability. 
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4 Empirical data 
This section presents the empirical data collected in this study in a straight-forward and 
objective manner, with minimal interpretation and without any analysis or discussion. The 
empirical data consists of descriptions of each of the four case firms and a summary of the 
interview with an industry expert. The case descriptions are primarily based on interviews 
conducted with key managers of the case firms, and complemented by data collected from 
company websites, annual reports and presentations. Analysis and discussion of the empirical 
data are deferred to the next two sections. 
 
4.1 Kongsberg Oil & Gas Technologies 
The information presented here is primarily based on interviews with Børre Larsen, Chief 
Operating Officer of Kongsberg Oil & Gas Technologies, and complemented with 
information from the websites of Kongsberg Oil & Gas Technologies and Kongsberg 
Gruppen, as well as proff.no. 
Company background 
Kongsberg Oil & Gas Technologies (KOGT) delivers subsea technologies, products and 
services as well as software and services to the global oil and gas industry. The company had 
243 employees and revenues of 543 million NOK in 2012. 
KOGT is part of Kongsberg Gruppen, which is a publicly traded Norwegian technology group 
targeting the global defense, maritime, oil and gas and aerospace industries. KOGT 
commenced as a separate business unit in 2009 and was formally established in 2010 as a 
result of gathering different oil and gas related products and services that had formerly been 
spread across Kongsberg Gruppen’s other business units, as well as recently acquired 
businesses, into one business unit. Kongsberg Gruppen had consolidated revenues of 15 652 
million NOK in 2012. 
KOGT consists of two divisions, namely Subsea and Software and Services, which are 
approximately equal in size. The Subsea division delivers engineering services related to 
subsea oil and gas constructs such as pipelines, risers and subsea installations on the seabed, 
as well as delivering hardware components for such subsea installations and follow-up and 
repair services to the installed base. The Software and Services division develops software 
ranging from basic data transport to decision-support software for the oil and gas operators. 
The software applications are often real-time and always based on open standards, so that 
customers can use it regardless of what other software is being used. The software 
applications target three areas, namely (1) drilling, (2) flow assurance and (3) simulation and 
production optimization. In general, the software offerings require much customization, as 
opposed to being standardized software, though more standardization is an ambition for the 
future. 
KOGT operates globally with offices in the USA (Houston), Brazil, Australia, India, the UK 
and the United Arab Emirates. Approximately half of the organization is based in Norway, but 
Børre Larsen guesses that between 50 and 80 percent of revenues come from customers 
outside of Norway. 
  
26 
 
Background related to Australia 
KOGT established a subsidiary in Australia with an office in Perth in the first quarter of 2012. 
This move was done on the basis of two contracts for pilot projects that the Software and 
Services division had been awarded with customers in Australia. Prior to this, KOGT had no 
business in Australia, but had targeted the market by travelling, seeking to win an initial 
contract upon which it could establish. Further contracts have been awarded and by the end of 
2012 the subsidiary had five employees, one CEO and sales manager and four engineers. 
In January 2013 KOGT acquired the subsea engineering company Apply Nemo, which 
already had an office in Perth, Australia, with approximately 25 employees. With this, KOGT 
gained access to the Australian market also with the Subsea division, through Apply Nemo’s 
customer base. The purchase of Apply Nemo was however not part of an entry strategy in 
Australia, rather the company was acquired for other reasons. This study exclusively focuses 
on KOGT’s market entry prior to the acquisition of Apply Nemo. 
Background related to Brazil 
In Brazil, KOGT established a subsidiary in 2012 after having exported subsea engineering 
services to one customer in Brazil since 2010. Subsequently, sales personnel from Software 
and Services were sent to Brazil and were awarded contracts, so that both divisions are now 
present. The office in Brazil started with two employees and has grown to 13 in little over a 
year. 
Rationale for market selection 
Prior to entry, both Australia and Brazil were deemed by KOGT as priority markets for 
expansion due to market size and growth, plus technological challenges that make them 
suitable to KOGT’s expertise, namely harsh conditions, great depths (Brazil) and long 
pipeline tiebacks (Australia). These aspects make these two markets suitable to a large portion 
of the technology that is developed in the North Sea, according to Larsen. Also, from KOGT’s 
point of view, the strict environmental requirements of these countries contribute to their 
attractiveness. 
Regarding market entry, Australia was assumed to be a pretty straight forward, characterized 
by “British/American culture, Western legislation and Western institutions, including tax 
regime and immigration”. In addition, the legal system was trusted to be capable of solving 
possible conflicts. There was only one complication regarding Australia, and that was “that it 
is tremendously far away, physically”. 
The assessment of Brazil was significantly different. KOGT had learned about market entry in 
Brazil from conversations with other companies, and had a clear perception that the 
institutional environment would pose major challenges and that entering Brazil would be a 
costly endeavor. This is illustrated by Børre Larsen’s description: 
”Everybody who had been there and everybody we talked to were pretty clear in stating that 
Brazil is, I should be careful saying less developed, but certainly differently developed than 
Western Europe, when it comes to legal system, institutions, tax system – all these rules that 
make up the framework for operating. Regarding visa, taxes, imports, everything. It takes a 
significantly longer time to understand the culture and to achieve an effective operation, and it 
is terribly expensive. That was our mindset when we entered Brazil. The vast majority of 
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companies we talked to said that if you go to Brazil you must be prepared to lose money for 
five to seven and maybe ten years. That is completely normal. Impossible to make money 
until after seven years was the perception.” 
Compared to Australia, Larsen added, the “costs of establishing an office in Brazil is of a 
whole other dimension.” 
When asked whether these complexities of entering Brazil ever got close to overthrow the 
whole market selection, Larsen admitted that they did consider it, but that with the pre-salt 
discoveries, the number of subsea installations and rigs that Petrobras had in its plans for the 
future, “it was evident to everyone that the next boom is Brazil. If you want to be part of the 
game, you have to go to Brazil”. Therefore the question was more “how and when to make 
the move”.  
Among other fast-growing markets, Australia and Brazil were considered more attractive and 
prioritized. Africa, Russia and China were also deemed as fast-growing markets, but less 
attractive due to complicated institutional aspects of these countries. 
Choice of entry mode 
When the two pilot project contracts were awarded and the decision was made to enter the 
Australian market, KOGT needed to choose an entry mode. According to Larsen, a leading 
principle for KOGT is to be close to customers. With Australia being so far away from 
Norway, Larsen saw using an agent, joint venture, acquisition and establishing a wholly-
owned subsidiary as the plausible alternatives. Establishing a subsidiary is the company’s 
primary choice, if the country’s framework is wieldable. Australia was considered to have 
“well established institutions operating with a Western mindset that we are familiar with, good 
legal system and little formal barriers from the authorities, no appreciable problems with 
culture or language, so we found establishing ourselves (a subsidiary) a good alternative.” He 
adds that it was considered inexpensive to get started and the costs of having to back out 
would be limited, so that in total, establishing a subsidiary on their own was not considered 
very risky. 
Regarding alternatives, using an agent was deemed not to be necessary, and the company tries 
to avoid agents in general, other than in countries where they don’t understand the culture, 
speak the language, or in countries that require a local sponsor. Establishing a joint venture or 
acquiring a company could have been viable options, if KOGT had come across an obvious 
candidate company, but it did not find it necessary to spend time looking for one.  
As mentioned above, KOGT exported services to one customer in Brazil before establishing a 
subsidiary. Exporting to Brazil was considered challenging, due to the country’s import and 
export regime being “crazy”, both the tax level and “how many times they add tax to one item 
that is moved back and forth”. The rules were considered difficult to understand for an 
outsider, making it difficult to operate as an exporter to Brazil. According to Larsen, the 
country has constructed a set of regulations such that, to be able to make money, a company 
needs to “establish locally, hire local employees and have a local value chain”. This is because 
Brazil desires business establishments in its own country. 
As the business with the Brazilian customer grew and exporting was deemed not to be a 
viable entry mode, several alternatives were considered. The use of agents were seriously 
considered in Brazil, but it stopped because KOGT did not find an agent it had sufficient 
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confidence in, and because there was an opportunity to build on the experiences and 
infrastructure of another company within Kongsberg Gruppen, namely Kongsberg Maritime 
(KM), which had established in Brazil just over a year in advance. By initially renting office 
space from KM, utilizing KM’s locally employed administrative staff, as well as its 
accounting bureau and legal advisors, KOGT managed to leap-frog some of the major hurdles 
to establishing a subsidiary in Brazil. Larsen admits, “if we didn’t have a Maritime operation 
down there, I doubt that we would have established on our own, at least not as soon, and we 
probably would have worked harder to find a good agent or partner.” When asked why, he 
continues “because Brazil is much more complicated for establishment, because of the 
framework conditions, ergo institutions, laws, language and culture. 
The spectrum of available entry modes in Brazil was on the one hand considered more 
limited, but on the other hand, it was more necessary to consider alternatives. Larsen explains: 
“One wanted to avoid several of the alternatives for Brazil, because there is a risk of being 
fooled or not understanding what is going on. Difficult to control. But at the same time, it was 
necessary to consider those alternatives in Brazil because it is so complex.” 
In summary, KOGT has gradually increased resource commitment in both markets. This is a 
deliberate entry strategy. KOGT first “warms up” foreign markets through deliberate sales and 
business development activities, but does so by travelling from Norway. The move to 
establish a subsidiary abroad is only made when the company’s contract revenues in the 
market can justify the investment. In Australia, two pilot project contracts were awarded 
which was considered to justify the relatively low costs associated with establishing a 
subsidiary there. In Brazil the company had an increasing workload for one customer. The 
contractual base upon which KOGT made the move to establish a subsidiary, was 
substantially larger in Brazil because the company expected higher costs and more severe 
challenges in the market entry process. 
Larsen explains that this gradual increase in resource commitment is based on two different 
aspects. First, KOGT has a philosophy that “earnings today are earnings tomorrow”. It does 
not want to take on the risk of investment until it is sufficiently sure about the subsequent 
income. The other reason is to avoid having to back out of a market, which sends unfortunate 
signals to the market. According to Larsen, the latter reason is particularly important in Brazil, 
because the culture there is such that companies need to demonstrate coming to Brazil for the 
long-term. He concludes: “So in Brazil it is important that when you go there, you must have 
the energy to stand there until you’re up and running. If you need to back out along the way, 
you have at least one minus on the record the next time you try.” 
Staffing and establishing foreign operations 
In Australia, KOGT established the subsidiary, hired a CEO and sales manager and a couple 
of service engineers, all from the local labor market. No substantial challenges were 
encountered and no substantial costs. The business was profitable after four months and the 
whole business case was positive within a year. 
In Brazil, KOGT sent down a Norwegian CEO, used KM’s existing infrastructure and hired a 
Brazilian sales force. After an initial period renting office space from KM, KOGT moved to 
its own space, and then again moved and expanded to its current space, housing 13 
employees. Though establishment costs were higher in Brazil, Larsen claims that profitability 
and investment payback was achieved similarly soon in Brazil as it was in Australia. 
29 
 
Among 18 employees across the two subsidiaries, only one is Norwegian, namely the CEO in 
Brazil. This demonstrates a clear preference towards hiring local employees as Larsen 
explains: 
“We use Norwegians to ensure that we have control over what’s going on. A Norwegian who 
knows the product lines we’re working on, and knows the way we operate at Kongsberg 
(KOGT), so that we have control over what is going on. But beyond that, we say that we shall 
be locally represented with local employees and show the local market that we are serious.” 
Having a Norwegian leader is considered more important for the purpose of control in Brazil 
than in Australia, due to reasons related to the institutional context, such as laws, language 
and cultural differences. The use of Norwegian employees for the purpose of achieving 
internal synergies, however, is not considered different across the countries. When asked 
about the reason for choosing a local leader in Australia, Larsen states that risks of 
establishing there were considered limited, and that KOGT’s judgment was that a local leader 
would be better equipped than a Norwegian without local market knowledge and contacts. His 
impression of the oil and gas community in Perth is that it is rather “small and tight”. 
According to Larsen the use of local employees is important in both these markets, also for 
the reason of reputation, which Larsen says distinguishes these markets from the American 
market, in which “it doesn’t matter where you come from or when you came as long as what 
you have is good.” 
Reputation is also relevant for another common challenge of entering these distant markets, 
namely recruiting while still being an unknown actor. According to Larsen, prospective 
workers perhaps more so in Brazil than in Australia, seek to “apply for and be employed by a 
company that they know, that has a track record, that can be trusted and that is known to be 
serious and long-term in its efforts. I can’t exactly remember the wording, but in Brazil they 
say that ‘you don’t hire an engineer, you hire the engineer and his whole family.’ Everyone in 
the family monitors who the employer is.”  Larsen admits that this is a challenge in the early 
phase, “to build the credibility that makes you attractive among prospective workers.” 
This is another argument for KOGT’s strategy of not entering a new market until it knows it is 
robust enough to afford staying, and avoid having to back out and send unfortunate signals to 
the local labor market. Larsen explains that “once we’re there, every single little activity must 
be a success. The first employee must be happy. He must feel that this was the right choice 
career wise, salary wise and in every possible way, so that he serves as a reference for the next 
employment. And then this spins positively.” 
Lastly, regarding local content requirements, Larsen admits that these constitute a challenge in 
the Brazilian market, but that these have been met by all work hours, engineering, service and 
maintenance being local, while the core product comes from Norway. 
Perceived successfulness of market entry 
According to Larsen, entering both these markets has turned out cheaper and faster than 
expected. Both subsidiaries where profitable within a few months and the initial investments 
were recovered within a year. KOGT had won contracts in both countries prior to establishing 
a subsidiary, and has been awarded more contracts and grown the organization after doing so. 
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When speculating around the reason for this successfulness, Larsen emphasizes the 
importance of being a little bit careful before “pressing the start button”. He continues: 
“Establish a little bit later than we perhaps could have done and more rapidly achieving 
profitability, instead of going too early and losing a lot of money.” In short, he accredits the 
KOGT philosophy of not establishing until it has been awarded work. 
Furthermore, Larsen emphasizes the importance of balancing costs and investments to the 
actual current business level along the way, having a flexible and scalable mindset. He advises 
to first win the contract, then assess its size and what it needs to deliver, and then select 
“office space, IT-solution, all those things, based on that”. 
Lastly, he emphasizes the importance of spending energy finding the right people, particularly 
in the early phase. 
Even though both market entry processes have been very successful, when asked which one 
of the two markets was most challenging to enter, Larsen clearly states Brazil and explains: 
“We have spent more time, energy and money on external advisors in Brazil to understand 
and get in place the cultural aspect. Understanding local regulations, understanding the tax 
regime, how to recruit, local employment contracts, how to pay salaries, how to pay taxes, all 
those things. It is much more complex than what we are used to from Western Europe, or at 
least very different. So to understand that is challenging and has to be done through local 
advisors.” 
 
4.2 NorSea Group 
The information presented here is primarily based on an interview with Knut Magne 
Johannessen, Director International & Project Operations of NorSea Group, and 
complemented with information from NorSea Group’s website as well as proff.no. 
Company background 
NorSea Group (NG) is a Norwegian provider of supply bases and logistics solutions to the 
offshore oil and gas industy. Established in 1965 in conjunction with the birth of the 
Norwegian offshore industry, the company today owns and operates nine strategically located 
supply bases along the Norwegian coastline. The company is privately owned, with the largest 
owner since 2012 being the global maritime industry group Wilh. Wilhelmsen, which is listed 
on the Oslo Stock Exchange. In 2011, NG had revenues of 2.5 Billion NOK. 
NG’s main service offering is the supply bases, which involves developing and managing 
infrastructure such as quays, offices and warehouses, as well as operating the supply base 
such as loading and unloading vessels, internal transport and storage and warehouse 
management. Directly or indirectly, the final customers are the offshore oil and gas operators. 
In addition to the supply bases, NG delivers logistics solutions on a project basis, particularly 
targeted at major subsea pipeline projects, for which NG has developed its own method and 
procedure. Knut Magne Johannessen estimates that this logistics projects activity on an 
average over the past ten years has accounted for approximately 15 percent of revenues, while 
the supply bases has accounted for the remaining 85 percent. 
The majority of NG’s business is in the home market, and despite no accurate figures 
Johannessen assumes that the Norwegian market accounts for over 90 percent of the 
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company’s revenues. So far, the international revenues have come from limited term projects 
that NG has conducted in countries such as Brazil, Iran, West-Africa, UK, Sweden, Finland, 
Germany, Malta and Indonesia. NG is usually awarded such projects either through enquiries 
from existing customers on the Norwegian Continental Shelf e.g. international oil and gas 
companies or by responding to tenders abroad. Aside from Australia, NG does not have 
permanent business in any foreign markets. 
Background related to Australia 
NG established a subsidiary and opened an office in Perth, Australia, in January 2011. The 
main motive for this establishment is prospective logistics projects in the short term, with the 
long term ambition of gaining a foothold in the Australian offshore market. The Australian 
subsidiary has one employee and is working with sales and business development towards 
being awarded contracts for logistics projects in Australia. NG has not signed any contracts by 
the time of the interview for this thesis. 
Background related to Brazil 
NG has actively worked towards market entry in Brazil, but has not yet made the move to the 
Brazilian market and the process is now put on hold. NG participated in Intsok’s Brazil Entry 
Program in 2012, in which it received support from Intsok and Innovation Norway in the 
development of a business plan for market entry in Brazil. In the wake of this program, NG 
worked targeted with the opportunity of establishing an offshore supply base in Brazil, but 
decided to put the Brazil market entry process on hold later in 2012. 
Rationale for market selection 
According to Johannessen, the main rationale behind targeting Australia and Brazil is the 
market outlook of each of these two countries. In particular, Johannessen adds, “Brazil, like 
Norway, is being rated now as the most attractive offshore market in terms of expected 
investment and activity”. Both markets are assessed to have high current and projected 
offshore activity, and both markets are relevant for subsea pipeline projects. Beyond market 
size and growth, NG assesses the capacity of its own particular services in the market in 
question, namely supply bases and logistics solutions. Other aspects considered regarding 
market selection are concrete sales leads and the desires, history and relations of the owners 
of NG. 
Furthermore, NG has an evaluation matrix for the assessment of potential countries for market 
entry. This matrix involves the eight weighted evaluation criteria (1) market size and growth, 
(2) offshore supply base demands and supply, (3) competitive intensity, (4) identified leads, 
(5) political stability/corruption, (6) local content requirements, (7) similar customer base and 
(8) Wilh. Wilhelmsen synergies. In its evaluation of potential markets, NG assigns a red, 
yellow or green color to each of these criteria, red indicating negative and green indicating 
positive circumstances. 
Australia is assessed to have a high competitive intensity, but Johannessen emphasizes that 
this is with regard to supply bases. There are limited natural locations of supply bases along 
the West and North-West coast of Australia, where the majority of the offshore oil and gas 
industry is located. Therefore, at least for the time being, the main motive for market entry in 
Australia is logistics projects. There are future prospects of many large subsea pipeline 
projects in Australia. 
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Furthermore, Australia is assessed yellow with regard to local content requirements, despite 
Australia not having mandatory local content requirements. This is however, due to 
Australia’s particularly strong labor unions and strict regulations on the use of foreign labor in 
Australia. NG assesses these regulations to limit its ability to staff a prospective project in 
Australia with foreign labor, for example a Norwegian crane operator for a logistics project. 
Further, a large value add in the pipeline projects is shipping. For example, pipelines would be 
loaded on a ship in Malaysia headed for Australia. In this case, the ship would need to have an 
Australian crew to be allowed to sail into Australian waters to unload. In other words, NG’s 
business is particularly affected by the local labor regulations in Australia. 
Other than these two aspects, Australia is considered straight-forward for market entry. 
Brazil is also assessed as yellow when it comes to local content requirements. But as opposed 
to Australia, Brazil is also assessed as yellow when it comes to political stability/corruption. 
Johannessen adds “bordering light red or pink, in my opinion” and continues: 
“(…)Brazil has a history where, on the superior political level, out of the blue, new laws and 
regulations can be passed that can affect firms’ ability to do business. And if you think about 
supply base establishment, after the Norwegian model where you wish to invest in permanent 
infrastructure, it is extremely important to know that it is not going to happen that, five years 
after having invested a billion kroner, you are not allowed to own it anymore, for example.” 
This fear that laws and regulations can be changed by authorities, which could be catastrophic 
to large investments in permanent infrastructure, without any ability for NG to influence it, 
was ultimately the main reason why NG in 2012 chose to put Brazil on hold. Johannessen 
adds, that he does “not think the risk of this type of changes is so high in Australia.” 
Another aspect that Johannesen points out, is the fact that the Brazilian market is so 
dominated by one actor, namely Petrobras. Being a relatively small supplier, trying to avoid 
ending up in contractual issues with a company like Petrobras, is by NG assessed to involve 
challenges and risks. 
In summary, Johannessen adds: 
“Country risk is a collection of factors, and to us I guess this is the main difference. We are a 
little bit more skeptical to doing business in Brazil.” 
So far, this has prevented NG from entering the Brazilian market, while Australia was entered 
despite being considered less attractive from a pure competitive point of view. 
Choice of entry mode 
As earlier described, the main motive for market entry in Australia in the short-term is the 
prospects of large subsea pipeline projects. Based on this, NG decided to establish a sales 
office in Perth, hired one employee to work with sales and business development with the 
ambition to be awarded an initial contract for such a project. Johannessen adds that this is a 
strategy in itself because “if we can win one project of a certain size, then we gain a foothold 
in the Australian market. We need to create a name for ourselves and get some references in 
Australia, and we can do that through such a project.” 
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According to Johannessen, NG did not very deeply consider alternatives to using a wholly-
owned subsidiary as the entry mode. Direct export, sales agent, licensing and franchising are 
ruled out due to quality concerns: 
“(…)what is important to us is that we have full control over the quality of what we ultimately 
deliver, and therefore we do not want any of those modes.” 
Other entry modes were excluded because there was not considered to be a need for 
acquisitions or partnerships in the way NG implements its projects: 
“(…)NorSea Group, put in simple terms, supply leadership and processes and procedures, and 
then hires labor locally. Labor, in terms of crane operators, lift operators, truck drivers. We 
want to try this model also in Australia, and for that we don’t need to buy anything or enter 
into a joint venture.” 
When asked, Johannessen denies that the choice of entry mode is affected by the institutional 
environment in Australia.  
Even though a wholly-owned subsidiary is generally considered to be an entry mode with 
high resource commitment. The sales office of one employee that NG has established in 
Australia does not commit a high level of resources. 
In Brazil on the other hand, the main goal was to establish a supply base. The model that was 
considered was to find a local Brazilian partner in possession of a geographical area. “In a 
country like Brazil, you are dependent on having a strong local partner,” says Johannessen. 
Furthermore, formal requirements in Brazil dictate that you need a Brazilian company that has 
been granted an environmental license, which takes a minimum of two years to be granted: 
“There is a very rigid, stepwise process to be granted the environmental license that allows 
you to operate a base, and that is not something NorSea Group can enter and do on its own. 
Then we need to either enter into a joint venture or acquire a company.” 
After working towards a joint venture scenario, travelling to Brazil, mapping, discussing and 
making contact with potential partners, NG decided to put the Brazil market entry on hold due 
to Brazil being considered a “tough market” to establish in, as well as internal capacity 
constraints and wanting to prioritize differently with respect to other potential markets. 
Johannessen adds that the decision to put Brazil on hold was not because NG could not find a 
partner: 
“We haven’t said that we didn’t succeed in finding a partner.(…)Even though you find 
someone who can be a good partner, you still have to handle the risk of establishing in Brazil, 
and have the capacity to do so in addition to all other activities.” 
According to Johannessen, entering Brazil may be re-evaluated in the future. 
Staffing and establishment of foreign operations  
NG has one employee in Australia, hired from the local market. According to Johannessen, 
establishing foreign operations was a quick and inexpensive process: 
“No, that took a quite short time. Again, Australia is such a country. It is very easy to 
understand and straight forward. It is a very straight forward process to establish a company 
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in Australia. Exactly how long it took, I don’t remember, but we’re talking about weeks. A 
very easy process. You need an auditor to complete and submit some paperwork and pay 
shareholder’s capital, and then you are basically underway.” 
In the event of NG being awarded a contract in Australia, it would recruit and build an 
organization in Australia. This has not yet been concretely planned, but Johannessen predicts 
that a tight labor market in the offshore industry in Australia, as in Norway, will make it 
challenging and expensive to get hold of competent people. 
Without having established in Brazil, when asked about it, Johannessen assumes that it would 
take a longer time and be more expensive. NG has learned from other firms’ experiences and 
Johannessen shares an example he has been told which relates to the cost of accounting: 
Supposedly, settling annual accounts in Norway requires 200 hours, while similar accounts 
would require 2000 hours in Brazil i.e. ten times the labor. 
Perceived successfulness of market entry  
Two years after opening an office in Perth, NG has not yet succeeded to land a contract in 
Australia: 
“We have not signed anything so far, but if you would call me again in two month, I hope that 
I could say that we have signed. We have worked actively for a long time towards one 
particular large pipeline project.” 
Johannessen states that if NG succeeds in signing this contract during the summer of 2013, 
the company will be very satisfied in achieving its goals for the market entry process, as this 
project was the main driver behind market entry in Australia. However, he continues: 
“If this year passes without getting a single job, then we would not be on track. Then I think 
we would have to sit down and go through the strategy again.” 
In Brazil, NG has put its market entry process on hold due to assessed challenges and risks, 
and the decision to prioritize other potential markets. This market entry process may, 
according to Johannessen, be continued at a later time. 
When asked which of these markets is the most challenging to enter, Johannessen says Brazil 
with the main reason being “the fear of not being able to retain long-term investments in 
infrastructure – ergo laws and regulations. The formal side, more than the informal side.” 
 
4.3 Aker Solutions 
The information presented here is primarily based on interviews with Anders Nordberg, Vice 
President of Business Improvement at Aker Solutions Subsea Brazil, and Alec Svendsen, Vice 
President of Engineering at Aker Solutions Australia. The presentation is complemented with 
information from the website of Aker Solutions and its annual report for 2012. 
In the case of Aker Solutions, since it has been operating in both Australia and Brazil for 
several years, the market entry aspects (1) rationale for market selection, (2) choice of entry 
mode, (3) staffing and establishing foreign operations and (4) perceived successfulness of 
market entry, are modified into (1) rationale for operating in Australia and Brazil, (2) entry 
mode of foreign business, (3) staffing and operating foreign business and (4) perceived 
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successfulness of foreign business. The insight of Aker Solutions is however considered 
greatly valuable and highly relevant to the corresponding aspects of foreign market entry 
strategy. 
Company background 
Aker Solutions provides oilfield products, systems and services for customers in the oil and 
gas industry world-wide. Starting as a small workshop in Oslo more than 170 years ago, the 
company today specializes in engineering and technologies for oil and gas drilling, field 
development and production. The company is headquartered in Oslo, Norway, and listed on 
the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
Aker Solutions is organized in three main segments, namely Engineering Solutions, Product 
Solutions and Field-Life Solutions, in 2012 representing 10, 57 and 32 percent of group 
revenues, respectively. Product Solutions is further split into five business areas, namely 
Subsea (SUB), Umbilicals (UMB), Drilling Technologies (DRT), Process Systems (PRS) and 
Mooring and Loading Systems (MLS). The Field-Life Solutions segment is further split into 
three business areas, namely Maintenance, Modifications and Operations (MMO), Well 
Intervention Services (WIS) and Oilfield Services and Marine Assets (OMA). As Engineering 
Solutions is its own business area, this amounts to nine business areas which constitute 
separate divisions within Aker Solutions. Subsea, Modifications and Operations and Drilling 
Technologies are the three largest divisions, which in 2012 represented 27, 25 and 19 percent 
of group revenues, respectively. 
With approximately 25 000 employees in 30 countries across the globe, Aker Solutions had 
revenues of nearly 45 billion NOK in 2012. Approximately half of the revenues come from 
the Norwegian market, and approximately half of the organization is based in Norway. 
Background related to Australia 
Aker Solutions has been present in Australia for many years, and is currently located in three 
major cities, Brisbane, Melbourne and Perth, with several operating entities and subsidiaries. 
The company has gone through significant changes in Australia, as a large portion of the 
Australian operations were sold in 2011, due to it not being part of Aker Solutions’ core 
business. According to Alec Svendsen the main entities in Australia are now Engineering 
Solutions, Subsea and Process Systems, and the majority of the approximately 160-170 
employees are based in Perth. According to Aker Solutions’ annual report for 2012, revenues 
from customers in Australia were 1.3 billion NOK in 2012. 
Background related to Brazil 
Aker Solutions has a history in Brazil dating more than 20 years back. Today, five of its nine 
operating entities are present with subsidiaries and employees. According to Anders 
Nordberg, the other operating entities may also on occasions have sales in Brazil. Aker 
Solutions has approximately 1 500 employees in Brazil and two factories, one under Subsea 
and one under Drilling Technologies, which are the two largest entities in Brazil, followed by 
Process Systems. According to Aker Solutions’ annual report for 2012, revenues from 
customers in South America, where Brazil is its only location, were 1.9 billion NOK in 2012. 
Rationale for operating in Australia and Brazil 
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Both for Australia and Brazil, the managers of Aker Solutions state market size and growth as 
the main drivers of the attractiveness of these markets from the perspective of Aker Solutions. 
Svendsen explains that the first thing one looks at is “the activity and the activity trend of the 
oil and gas operators over time. The volume of oil and gas work, particularly offshore in Aker 
Solutions’ case.” In the longer term, he explains that Aker Solutions assesses the 
announcement of licenses for oil and gas exploration. These are all indicators of the size and 
growth of the oil service market. 
When asked whether other aspects of the countries are considered, the picture is slightly 
different for Australia and Brazil. 
In the Brazil case, Nordberg responds: 
“It plays a role. It is a collective assessment. What is attractive is, as you mentioned, that it is 
a large market with strong growth. That is the starting point, and then we must take into 
account the challenges involved in being present there, and the main challenge is local content 
regulations. We need to figure out how we can solve the fact that two thirds of the subsea 
equipment needs to be produced in Brazil.” 
Nordberg goes on to highlight three challenging areas, when it comes to doing business in 
Brazil, namely lack of infrastructure, tax and bureaucracy and lack of educated labor force. 
Regarding Australia, on the other hand, Svendsen cannot recall discussions on such topics and 
explains that there is not much focus on country-specific challenges in Australia: 
“I believe leaders and management in Aker Solutions, rightly so, assumes that one can do 
business here just as easily as in Great Britain or the USA and such countries. The legal 
system resembles the British, which is known. Culturally I guess Australia is situated 
somewhere between Great Britain and the USA(…)With regard to tax, the country is 
relatively well developed, and these days there are tax agreements between Norway and 
Australia, which makes things a little bit easier. So I don’t think anyone in Aker Solutions 
finds it problematic to come down here and do business as a service company.” 
One aspect that Svendsen nonetheless points out is that Australia is known for its strict labor 
unions and strict regulations regarding the use of foreign labor. This however is more relevant 
to the oil and gas operators, and has not constituted a particular challenge for Aker Solutions. 
In summary, Svendsen says: 
“Australia is an attractive market because there is a very large activity volume here, and it is 
within the area in which we operate internationally, on a global basis, and therefore we should 
absolutely be able to be a contributor here, for it is relatively straightforward to do business in 
this country.” 
Entry mode of foreign business  
Aker Solutions has been established in both Australia and Brazil for several years, and in 
terms of entry mode, it has established multiple wholly-owned subsidiaries in both countries 
with a large number of employees and a high level of investment and resource commitment. 
When asked about the main reasons for serving the Brazilian market through wholly-owned 
subsidiaries as opposed to other entry modes, Nordberg emphasizes that the size of the 
operations in the particular market is an important factor: 
37 
 
“At some point when things get large enough, it is more profitable or more efficient to be 
present than to export from somewhere else. So it is the size of the market, but it is a 
combination with the requirements of local content, which causes one to establish earlier than 
one otherwise would have, for us in oil and gas. And the third aspect is the complexity. As 
was mentioned earlier, you realize that you have to be on the ground in Brazil.” 
When it comes to the Australian market, Svendsen emphasizes the demands of the customers: 
“To have Aker Solutions in Norway doing business here through an agent etc. – they (the 
customers) wouldn’t be interested in that. They wouldn’t bother. In that case, they would go to 
our competitors.” 
Due to this demand to be close to the customers and the fact that Aker Solutions “delivers 
high technology and expensive equipment and engineering services on a very high level”, he 
believes that Aker Solutions is “better off being present as Aker Solutions, across the street 
from the oil companies.” 
This importance of proximity to the customers is obviously also relevant for the Brazilian 
market, manifested by Aker Solutions in 2011 introducing a new regional management 
structure, and in the first round prioritizing new regional managers in Brazil and North 
America. Executive Chairman of Aker Solutions, Øyvind Eriksen stated it clearly in his 
speech during the 2011 Aker Solutions Capital Markets Day: 
“Our purpose is to get closer to the market and closer to the customer, because the idea behind 
operating an important and large market, like Brazil, from Oslo, has simply speaking failed.” 
Even though Aker Solutions is present with the entry mode associated with the highest level 
of resource commitment in both of these markets, namely wholly-owned subsidiaries, there 
are however differences to the levels of resource commitment across the two markets. This is 
illustrated by Table 2 from the 2012 annual report of Aker Solutions, which presents revenues, 
non-current assets and capital expenditures across geographical markets. Even though the sum 
of revenues in 2011 and 2012 is only 19 percent higher in Brazil than in Australia, the average 
level of non-current assets is 23 times (2 212 %) higher and the sum of capital expenditure is 
17 times (1 630 %) higher in Brazil than in Australia. In addition to this the interviewees 
stated that the number of employees in Australia and Brazil is approximately 165 and 1 500, 
respectively, which translates to the number of employees being almost 9 times (782 %) 
higher in Brazil than in Australia. 
Amounts in 
NOK Million 
Operating revenue and other income Non-current assets Capital expenditure 
2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 
Norway 23 940 16 013 11 653 9 481 1 830 2 852 
Europe 4 986 4 910 3 275 3 174 379 221 
North America 3 033 3 502 612 646 101 120 
South America 1 877 1 569 575 396 227 119 
Asia 7 545 7 572 1 101 782 398 59 
Australia 1 323 1 567 26 16 14 6 
Other 2 218 1 341 148 79 12 8 
Total 44 922 36 474 17 390 14 574 2 961 3 385 
 
Table 2 – Aker Solutions Geographical information from the 2012 Annual Report 
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The main reason for this elevated level of resource commitment in Brazil, is a direct 
regulatory requirement, namely the local content requirement. For subsea equipment, 
according to Nordberg, the local content requirement is 60 to 70 percent and it is strictly 
enforced. To achieve such a high level of local content, Nordberg states that one has to have a 
factory there. Indeed, one of Aker Solutions’ only three world-wide subsea factories is in 
Brazil, and this factory is currently undergoing expansion. Aker Solutions also has a factory 
for drilling equipment there. All this, despite Brazil according to Nordberg having a poorly 
developed and expensive infrastructure, a complex tax system and bureaucracy and a lack of 
and expensive supply of skilled workers. Nordberg admits that the assessment of where in the 
world to establish factories is not done in a normal manner, because of the local content 
requirements. He speculates: 
“The local content requirements constitute a central precondition, which I assume, again these 
are only speculations, cause us to have a much larger production in Brazil than we otherwise 
would have had, and therefore a larger organization and a larger establishment.” 
Furthermore, if it weren’t for the local content requirements, Nordberg ponders: 
“One can imagine that we would have had a certain production there, but not as much as we 
have now. Perhaps we would have had an office or an organization to carry out the first parts 
of a project – design, engineering, pre-projecting etc. – and perhaps, these are again 
speculations, but one could imagine that we would have done the actual fabrication of the 
steel and some complex parts at existing factories elsewhere in the world. At least we would 
have done that for a longer time before establishing a factory in Brazil, and then one would 
have assessed under normal circumstances, what the pros and cons of establishing in Brazil 
are.” 
In Australia, even though there are regulatory pressures encouraging local content, these are 
not enforced in the same strict manner as in Brazil, and according to Svendsen, “in reality I 
will not say that these constitute much of an obstacle, at least not for our type of work.” 
Indeed, Aker Solutions’ Subsea division in Australia imports high technology equipment from 
abroad, and merely assembles it in Australia, while the Process Systems division moved all its 
fabrication to China a few years ago. According to Svendsen, due to the high cost level in 
Australia, almost all large structures and platforms etc. for the Australian market is made 
abroad: “It is too expensive to manufacture such things in Australia”. Furthermore, because 
Australia does not have “capacity to build large offshore structures and such things in its own 
country, they are forced to import it.” The same goes for highly specialized equipment, such 
as that of Aker Solutions: “Since there are no suppliers of such advanced and specialized 
equipment in the country, it is not in the interest of the authorities to prevent us from 
importing that equipment, which the industry here needs, and from which the authorities 
ultimately receive tax.” 
Staffing and operating foreign business 
According to the two managers of Aker Solutions, both Australia and Brazil are associated 
with high costs of operating a foreign subsidiary, but for slightly different reasons. 
In Australia, the high cost level is caused directly by high labor costs in the country, especially 
in Perth, where a majority of the oil industry is located. This is however counteracted by Aker 
Solutions doing part of the labor abroad: 
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“It is a high-cost country, so we try to find solutions in which we do some things here and 
some in other countries, as long as we are authorized to do so. There are some restrictions on 
imports, but they are rather reasonable as Australia wants things done and doesn’t have a local 
industry to do these things, so they accept that they have to buy these things from abroad.” 
According to Svendsen, Australia is known for strong labor unions and strict regulations on 
the use of foreign labor. This is considered a major reason why the local industry in general is 
struggling with a high cost level. 
Despite Brazil having almost ten times the population of Australia, Anders Nordberg 
describes a tight labor market in the oil and gas industry. Due to a rather low education level, 
finding qualified workers is considered the largest organizational challenge of operating in 
Brazil. The large demand and relatively low supply of skilled workers, particularly in the oil 
and gas industry, causes the salaries of local managers in Akers Solutions’ subsidiaries in 
Brazil to exceed the salaries of similar management positions in Norway. 
Nordberg emphasizes that the cost level is “a function of the general price level, how long it 
takes to get things done, the quality received and then what the price becomes to get things 
done.” Ultimately, he believes that firms are surprised by the high cost level in Brazil. 
One factor making it expensive to operate in Brazil is bureaucracy. Nordberg elaborates: 
“Brazil is very bureaucratic. It is heavy to operate in, slightly rigid and inflexible. A lot of 
processes, a lot of approvals, a lot of state and regional authorities(…)rarely anyone speaking 
English. It is heavy.” 
Particularly, Nordberg emphasizes the complexities of the Brazilian tax system: 
"It is very complicated, and it is recognized by both Brazilians and foreigners that it isn’t just 
complicated, all countries have a more or less complicated tax system, but in Brazil it is much 
more complicated than in almost all other countries, so all this requires a certain amount of 
resources. It is particularly heavy if you come alone as a Norwegian firm thinking that ‘we’re 
going to establish in Brazil’. Then it can be more challenging than it would have been to 
establish in, certainly in Australia.” 
Nordberg also emphasizes that poorly developed infrastructure, and the lack thereof, 
constitute a challenge which makes it expensive to operate in Brazil. This includes the 
transport system, such as roads and railways, and the telephone network. 
With regard to choosing between expatriates and local employees, both managers argue that 
they primarily seek to have local employees, but that a certain mix is preferable. 
Among the 160-170 employees in Australia, Aker Solutions has five or six Norwegian 
expatriates, and one of these is a manager, namely Svendsen himself. The others are 
specialists in certain technological fields bringing specific expertise from the Norwegian 
parent company. 
Svendsen assumes that one of the reasons that Aker Solutions last year hired him in a top 
management position in Australia, was that he is Norwegian and has international business 
experience, also specifically in Australia. Svendsen believes that having people in the foreign 
organization with the country-specific business culture of the parent company, is important, 
and that it is a way of indirectly exerting control over the subsidiary: 
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“The fact that you have someone with the same business culture, or an understanding of the 
business culture of the parent company, is indirectly a way of exercising a control activity. 
You have your man in place down there, and he has eyes and is loyal to the central group 
management etc.(…)I won’t proclaim that locals are disloyal, but perhaps they have a 
different business culture and don’t question things that the management in Oslo might want 
questioned. I would think that this is even more relevant in a country like Brazil.” 
When asked whether this form of exerting control over the subsidiary is particularly important 
in Australia, Svendsen emphasizes that there are other countries where this is a more obvious 
need, but that he has observed through the media surprisingly many scandals involving 
corruption in Australian authorities, so it does exists. 
Among the 1 500 employees in Brazil, the number of Norwegian expatriates is very low, 
maybe 1 %, but in management positions Nordberg would guess that 10-20 percent are 
Norwegian expatriates. One reason for having Norwegian expatriates is according to 
Nordberg, bringing specific knowledge to the Brazilian subsidiary. Within subsea, for 
example, Aker Solutions has been doing this for a longer time and has more expertise in 
Norway. Another reason for hiring Norwegian expatriates is for them to be a link to the parent 
company, providing control and making the Brazilian branch of the company run more 
effectively. Nordberg adds that Aker Solutions has also sent Brazilian expatriates to Norway 
to learn and bring knowledge back to Brazil. 
In 2012, after previously having separate managements for each division, Aker Solutions 
hired a regional manager responsible for all divisions in Brazil. For that top management 
position, the company chose a Brazilian local as opposed to a Norwegian expatriate. 
Perceived successfulness of foreign business 
According to Alec Svendsen, Aker Solutions has not been performing satisfactorily in the 
Australian market during the past ten years. He explains: 
“There has been a lot of change due to the separation with Kværner and the sale of much of 
the activity to Jacobs etc. There has not been stability(…)We are now in the midst of a 
structured development phase again, so the hope of improvement is ahead of us.” 
Svendsen further emphasizes that this unsatisfactory performance in Australia has been 
caused by a lack of focus and local impetus by Aker Solutions in Australia, rather than 
challenges posed by Australia as a country. 
When asked about the successfulness of operations in Brazil during recent years, Anders 
Nordberg emphasizes that Aker Solutions has gained a very strong position in the Brazilian 
market: 
“Within oil and gas, and particularly subsea with the five billion NOK contract I mentioned 
earlier that we won the other day, we have a very good position and we have a large 
organization, and it functions well.(…)We have a plan and will make money going forward.” 
However, Aker Solutions has also experienced some bumps in the road in Brazil. Particularly, 
in 2011 it reported a loss of 500 million NOK in Brazil. Nordberg explains in general terms: 
“It is challenging. It is kind of a rough ride requiring resources and long-term thinking and 
Brazilian employees and all that.(…)If one underestimates the challenges we have talked 
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about, one can easily strike a bump in the road. You can get stuck. If you have a plan of 
investing a certain amount and plan to start making money after a certain time, and then that 
doesn’t happen because everything takes a longer time, and you can’t get hold of the people 
you need, and you can’t establish, there are taxes and bureaucracy etc.” 
In the concrete case of the losses in 2011, Nordberg admits that it was partly due to a lack of 
control: 
“It is not easy making these complex subsea installations, and we weren’t able to keep what 
we had promised in Brazil. We had promised a lot, and the quality problems that arose should 
have been properly addressed sooner than what was done. By then it had gone far and we had 
lost a lot more money than we should have. Now we have confronted it, among other things 
with a new management and within the subsea division, which is the largest division that 
incurred the biggest losses, we have a number of expats in place, who address this.” 
When asked specifically, Nordberg acknowledges that a culture of avoiding to notify when 
things are not going as planned might have been an element in the reason for these quality 
problems not being properly addressed at an earlier point in time. In conclusion, Nordberg 
argues: “Now we have taken steps that will hopefully prevent such things from happening 
again.” 
 
4.4 Eureka Pumps 
The information presented here is primarily based on an interview with Tom Gustavsen, 
Director Sales and Marketing at Eureka Pumps, and complemented with information from 
Eureka’s website as well as proff.no. 
Company background 
Eureka Pumps is a supplier of pumps covering most applications within the oil and gas 
industry. Eureka’s history dates back to 1896 in Oslo, Norway. In the 1960’s the company 
started designing and manufacturing pumps for marine applications and in the 1970’s for oil 
and gas applications. The company has undergone many changes, including demergers and 
name and ownership changes, and what remains as Eureka Pumps today is the pump business 
targeting the oil and gas industry. In 2011, the company had approximately 170 employees 
and revenues of 445 million NOK. 
Since the end of 2010, Eureka Pumps is a wholly-owned part of Align, a group of six 
companies which are all suppliers of production and safety critical equipment and solutions to 
the Norwegian oil and gas and maritime industries, as well as selected international markets. 
In 2011, the group had revenues of 854 million NOK. Align is owned by two private 
companies, the largest of which being Hitec Vision, a large Norwegian private equity investor. 
According to Tom Gustavsen, Eureka’s main application areas are fire water pumps, seawater 
pumps and crude oil pumps, of which fire water pumps is the largest business area 
constituting more than half of the business. Eureka designs and manufactures pumps directly 
or indirectly for the oil and gas operators, in addition to providing after sales services such as 
maintenance and repairs to the installed base. According to Gustavsen, these after sales 
services amount to approximately half of the company’s revenues. Delivery of new pumps 
involves significant customization based on particular customer requirements for each project, 
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and both Eureka’s technology and overall system knowledge within the application areas are 
critical success factors. 
Eureka has been selling its products internationally for a long time, but the international focus 
has increased significantly during the past three to four years. According to Gustavsen, the 
share of international sales has gone from five to ten percent to approaching 50 percent. 
Eureka has an office in Houston, USA, with four employees, agents in Paris, Korea and 
Malaysia, has a company but no employees in Brazil and is currently establishing a company 
in Australia. 
Background related to Brazil 
In 2010, Eureka decided to establish its first two foreign subsidiaries in Brazil and the USA. 
In Brazil Eureka chose to both establish and staff the subsidiary with locally contracted 
human resources. The subsidiary was primarily a sales office working towards qualifying as a 
supplier to Petrobras. Subsequently, Eureka has decreased its focus on Brazil and the 
subsidiary is still without employees. 
Background related to Australia 
Eureka is currently in the process of establishing a company in Perth, Australia. The company 
has previously been serving the Australian market directly from Norway, but has recently 
decided to establish a local presence. 
Rationale for market selection 
For both markets, Eureka’s main rationale for market selection is the size and growth of the 
markets: 
“The motive is always based on the possibility of supplying those areas with our equipment – 
the more projects we see coming, the more interesting it is to be present. That is the main 
driver.” 
Furthermore, Gustavsen adds that the type of projects is also relevant, as “there are some that 
we have a greater chance of winning than others”. 
In the Australian market, Eureka perceived that there were few players properly present 
within its particular type of equipment. It already had Woodside, the major oil and gas 
operator in Australia, as a customer, and perceived that there would be more projects to come. 
Also the technical requirements of the projects in Australia were assessed to be similar to 
those of the Norwegian market and therefore familiar to Eureka. 
When asked whether external aspects of these countries, such as laws, politics, regulations, 
language barriers or cultural differences, were considered at this stage, Gustavsen explains 
regarding Brazil: 
“I don’t think that initially was part of the consideration, but when we see it in retrospect, it is 
obviously of great importance.” 
In general terms, Gustavsen reflects: 
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“I believe that many companies have pursued and are pursuing Brazil because they see the 
enormously large potential. And perhaps, one gets a little bit blinded by that. That is my 
personal opinion.”  
Choice of entry mode 
Prior to 2010, when Eureka decided to establish subsidiaries in Brazil and the USA, it had 
only been serving international markets through sales agents and travelling from Norway. In 
Brazil, Eureka had previously had a sales agent, but that relationship had been terminated 
before deciding to establish a wholly-owned subsidiary. 
In Brazil, establishing the subsidiary was done purely with external contracted resources, and 
no direct employees of Eureka. In retrospect, Gustavsen believes that this “solution was not 
positive”, and explains that this may be either due to lack of motivation of the locally 
contracted personnel or the lack follow-up capacity of the parent company. 
With regard to the Australian market, Eureka has been selling to Woodside from Norway and 
now seek to get closer to the customer, as it recently decided to “enter through a sales office to 
be local enough to take advantage of being present and provide the necessary support for 
these projects.” Gustavsen adds that Eureka has “of course already been in contact with some 
of the projects running down there, and we merely seek to strengthen that contact by having 
people there locally.” 
Regarding particular obstacles to the choice of entry mode in Australia, Eureka’s experience is 
that there are very few, other than getting in place an after sales service arrangement, which 
Eureka seeks to do through a local alliance partner. 
In Brazil on the other hand, local content regulations constitute a critical obstacle, as Eureka 
has realized that to achieve the approximately 60 percent local content required by Brazilian 
authorities and oil operators, it would be forced to produce in Brazil. Setting up its own 
production facilities in Brazil would require a substantially higher resource commitment than 
merely operating a sales office, and this is the main reason why Eureka has reduced its 
activities and focus in Brazil. 
Staffing and establishment of foreign operations  
Given that Eureka has a subsidiary with no employees in Brazil, and has not yet established a 
company in Australia, it has limited experience when it comes to staffing and establishing 
foreign operations in these countries. 
In Brazil however, as already mentioned, Eureka established a sales office purely with 
contracted human resources, one full time and a few part-time. These were operating the 
subsidiary on behalf of Eureka. This solution has not been considered successful. In Australia, 
it will also rely on advice from external consultants, but the subsidiary will be staffed by two 
employees from the parent company, one Norwegian and one third country national. 
Perceived successfulness of market entry  
Despite merely being in the process of market entry in Australia and Brazil, Eureka does have 
some valuable insights to share and Gustavsen has a clear perception that Brazil poses more 
challenges to market entry than Australia: 
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“Our experience and the perception we have, is that doing business in Brazil is extremely 
much more difficult than in Australia. If you have the technology that the oil companies seek, 
it is a lot easier to get in position in Australia.” 
Gustavsen however realizes that there are companies within Eureka’s field that have invested 
and established in Brazil, and that these companies are now being rewarded with contracts. 
He therefore admits that “it can be favorable and profitable to pursue Brazil, it may be, but 
there is an entry ticket here that is higher than in any other market, and one therefore becomes 
a little bit more doubtful about going the whole way.”  
In Gustavsen’s view, the local content requirements have made Brazil a very isolated market 
compared to the rest of the world. He argues that there are different companies that are the 
main players in the Brazilian market compared to other markets, which are much more 
interconnected across country borders. In Brazil, local content is the deciding factor, rather 
than the best technology, the lowest price, the greatest efficiency etc.  
 
4.5 Industry expert – Svein Harald Øygard, McKinsey & Company 
Background 
The information presented here is exclusively based on an interview with Svein Harald 
Øygard, Partner of the global consultancy McKinsey & Company. Øygard joined McKinsey 
& Company in 1995. He became Partner in 2000 and Director in 2006. He is currently 
responsible for the consultancy’s global competence development and research within the Oil 
and Gas sector. 
Øygard has substantial experience and expertise on the subject of this study. He has directly 
and indirectly been involved in client projects concerning market entry in the Australian and 
the Brazilian oil service markets and in portfolio management projects involving assets in 
these two markets. Furthermore, specifically to the Brazilian market, Øygard has recently 
conducted a comprehensive analysis of the Brazilian oil and gas supply chain and spent a 
significant part of his time in 2012 working with this. 
Rationale for market selection 
When asked what factors Norwegian oil service firms generally emphasize when considering 
whether or not to enter Australia and Brazil, Øygard explains that aspects of the particular oil 
and gas basin is the starting point for market selection. He argues: 
“Most companies begin with some sort of assessment of the size of the basin and the volume 
of activity within the segments that are most relevant to those companies, and that depends on 
the technology choices being made.  So it is first the basin size per se and basin 
characteristics, including the choices of technology.” 
Øygard describes this as the first “philter” of the pre-entry market assessment, and 
collectively these are all indicators of the size and growth of the market, and more specifically 
the market segments that the entrant firm is targeting. According to Øygard, firms generally 
find both Australia and Brazil large and fast-growing, but he emphasizes that the size and 
growth rate of the Brazilian oil service market is “gigantic” and indicates that it is larger than 
the Australian market. 
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The next philter firms usually employ is, according to Øygard, a general assessment of the 
preconditions for doing business in the foreign country. At this stage it is merely a general 
assessment of the business culture, business sentiment and openness of the foreign country, 
not specific to the oil and gas sector, and Øygard argues that both Australia and Brazil are 
favorable in this respect. With regard to Brazil he adds that there are more specific regulatory 
challenges, but he distinguishes between those and this more general assessment of the ease of 
doing business in the country. Øygard points to Norwegian firms such as Yara, Hydro and 
Statoil, which have all built large businesses in Brazil, and argues that Brazil is a country 
where Norwegian firms have demonstrated a great ability to operate. 
Next, firms consider which oil and gas operators are prevalent in the particular market. There 
often exist strong relationships between operators and oil service firms across different oil and 
gas basins. Øygard explains: 
“It is of course the operators that control much of this, and if an operator that one is used to 
working with in other basins is there, then most companies will see that as an argument that 
favors entering that basin.” 
In Australia, the familiar Western operators are prevalent. There is however a different 
structure than there is in the North Sea, with different operators being the dominant ones. In 
Brazil, Petrobras is the dominant operator. Øygard argues that even though this is not an 
operator that firms are used to from other markets, it is a reputable and competent operator. In 
summary, both Australia and Brazil involve favorable conditions with respect to operators. 
Lastly in the initial screening of potential markets, Øygard argues that firms evaluate the 
competitive intensity and the extent of suppliers of similar products and services in the market 
segment. He argues that the competitive intensity is particularly high in Australia and that the 
supply structures to a larger degree are established in Australia than in Brazil. Many of the 
same operators that are prevalent in the Gulf of Mexico (USA) and the UK are also prevalent 
in Australia, and this naturally brings their usual oil service suppliers to the Australian market. 
Øygard’s perception is therefore that Norwegian suppliers may have a slight disadvantage 
against the established supply structures in the Australian market. In Brazil on the other hand, 
relationships between Petrobras and its suppliers are still less rigid and less established. 
 Collectively what has been described so far is what Øygard refers to as a first level of 
screening. Given that there is a match with the entrant firm’s overall strategies, capacity and 
reach, both Australia and Brazil are so far generally assessed as favorable for market entry. 
With regard to the next level of screening, Øygard continues: 
“Then there is the next level of screening, which is more ‘how can we do this, and is it even 
possible to enter?’ In this case, the picture is rather different across the two basins.” 
In Australia, Øygard argues that there is a “level playing field”. There is a relatively open 
structure and regulations are relatively straight forward. Entrants are not worried about 
government approvals. He does, however, point out that it is a highly inflated economy due to 
several sectors growing rapidly in Western Australia. This has resulted in a very high price 
level. In other words, the industry’s own challenges are the main barriers in Australia, as 
opposed to external factors. 
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In Brazil, on the other hand, there are several challenges external to the industry. According to 
Øygard, what first meet the eye are the local content requirements, which vary between the 
concession bidding rounds, but typically result in operators committing to for example 65 % 
local content. On the top of that there have been established consortia for delivering the local 
content, in which Brazilian companies have taken on leading and controlling roles, sometimes 
marginalizing international technology providers. Furthermore, there are a whole range of 
different import and export taxes and fees. Øygard explains: 
“Brazil is in fact the country in the world, among all countries with official statistics, that has 
the lowest export and import share of GDP. That reflects a protectionist attitude, and it is 
backed up by all sorts of import and export taxes and fees.” 
Furthermore, according to Øygard, the largest customer Petrobras has historically been quite 
firm on its contract approach. It has for example sometimes required fixed prices and turn-key 
delivery, which for suppliers is challenging in an inflationary economy where there are many 
varying parameters. According to Øygard, this has led several companies to withdraw from 
the Brazilian market. Øygard states: 
“It is easier to point out companies that have lost money in Brazil than it is to point out 
companies that have made money in Brazil. And some of the losses have been monumental.” 
According to Øygard, however, some suppliers have pointed to a recent change of risk sharing 
mechanisms, for example with contracts allowing suppliers to pass through inflation in the 
costs of rigs and components.  
In summary, Øygard describes the Brazilian market as regulated on many levels. First, the 
specific local content requirements, second, a protectionist sentiment and expectations that 
Brazilian firms are in leading positions, third, a range of export and import fees and taxes, and 
fourth, Petrobras with a firm contract approach. Thus, according to Øygard, even though 
Brazil is considered favorable for market entry on a general level, these more specific 
institutional challenges make it highly demanding for foreign entrants. Øygard though stresses 
that some companies don't fully see the opportunities in Brazil and how to succeed the 
Brazilian way. Brazil is a superpower, with millions of trained professionals and engineers. 
Many companies and entities are well performing. 
Choice of entry mode 
With regard to entry mode, Øygard’s perception is that firms employ a more “light touch” 
mode in Australia and a more “heavy touch” mode in Brazil. This is due to several reasons. 
First, according to Øygard, it is due to Brazil being a larger market. Second, Australia is 
familiar enough and regulations allow market entry without substantial complications. Firms 
therefore end up with a local sales office or sales agent, perhaps in addition to a simple site for 
finalizing products. 
In Brazil on the other hand, due to the specific institutional challenges described above, 
Øygard argues that there is a demand for a more substantial local presence. He argues that 
firms potentially need a heavier partner and something to utilize in building a real position 
towards Petrobras. He continues: 
“It becomes more binary in Brazil. Either you are serious and enter with all you’ve got, or you 
are not serious and you stay away.” 
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Øygard adds that the characteristics of the product or service in question and the expected size 
of the foreign business also influence the degree of local presence involved in the entry mode. 
He further argues that some sort of subsidiary is very common in both countries. The question 
is therefore rather the degree of local presence than the choice between the distinct entry 
modes, such as direct export, sales agent, licensing, joint venture etc.  
Staffing and establishment of foreign operations  
With regard to the challenges of staffing and establishing foreign operations, Øygard 
emphasizes two challenges. One challenge is building a local organization which includes the 
choice between using expatriates and hiring from the local labor market. He argues that 
expatriates are expensive, while hiring locally is challenging without having a brand that is 
familiar in the foreign market. The next challenge, according to Øygard, is getting the chance 
to demonstrate what the firm can do and thereby developing references and contacts. Øygard 
refers to the chicken and the egg dilemma and continues: 
“It ends up as the chicken and the egg. You don’t get an organization if you don’t have any 
business, and you don’t get any business if you don’t have an organization.” 
He therefore argues that it is important to have some sort of initial business as a starting point 
when establishing foreign operations. 
When comparing Australia and Brazil, Øygard argues that the threshold to establishing in 
Brazil is higher than in Australia. His perception is that smaller companies have managed to 
establish in Australia, but that Brazil requires a certain size and local presence. He again 
points to the challenging local content requirements combined with the contract approach of 
Petrobras. This combination has led firms to back out of the Brazilian market. 
Perceived successfulness of market entry 
With regard to his perception of the successfulness of Norwegian oil service firms in entering 
these two markets, Øygard argues that firms entering Australia has struggled with the 
competitive intensity, and the distance to the subsidiary. The Australian organization may 
develop in its own direction and perhaps fade away from the Norwegian parent company. He 
adds, however, that there are certainly firms that have succeeded in entry, but that it may have 
rendered a little bit small in size. 
In Brazil, certain companies have succeeded as well, but there are several examples of firms 
that have incurred losses and backed out of the market. Øygard adds, however, that he 
perceives the current uplift or momentum of the Brazilian market, also with respect to the role 
of Norwegian firms, to be greater than that of the Australian market. 
When asked which one of the two markets is the most challenging to enter for Norwegian oil 
service companies, Øygard says: 
“In sum, Brazil is the most challenging market, but the size and upside is larger. Regulations 
are of course a big part of it. Local content, both explicitly and implicitly, and export and 
import fees, make it more binary. If you want to enter, you have to do it completely. You 
cannot do it ‘the easy way’. In addition, Brazil may also longer term be a more natural 
location for resource centers, production and fabrication as opposed to e.g. Western Australia. 
Our analysis shows that Brazil will need increased local production and exports to achieve 
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growth and balance out imports as the economy grows, and key sectors like the oil & gas 
services sector will eventually be a natural part of this.” 
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5 Cross-case analysis 
The previous section presents the empirical data of the study in a straight-forward and 
objective manner. This section synthesizes the observations across the cases, and goes further 
in interpreting and analyzing the findings. The findings from the interview with the industry 
expert are included and complement the analysis. The analysis organized in correspondence 
with the considered aspects of foreign market entry strategy, in the same way as each of the 
case descriptions in the previous section. 
5.1 Rationale for market selection 
Market size and growth 
All case firms clearly emphasize the market potential, more specifically market size and 
growth, as the shear basis for the attractiveness of these two markets and therefore the main 
rationale for market selection. Above all other aspects regarding the two countries, the market 
potential is the main motivation for selecting these particular markets. Particularly Brazil was 
perceived as a “booming” market by KOGT, NG and Eureka, and there seem to exist a 
perception in the Norwegian oil service industry that one has to pursue a market entry in 
Brazil in order to be a relevant player. This is however contradictory to Eureka’s observation 
that Brazil is an isolated market, somewhat disconnected from the global oil and gas industry. 
Market size and growth are industry-based influences. 
The industry expert shares this view, and states that firms start out by assessing the size and 
growth of the oil and gas basin, which are fundamental indicators of the market size and 
growth in the oil service industry. The industry expert also shares the perception that Brazil 
has an even greater market potential than Australia. 
The fit of firm resources in the market 
Another important rationale for market selection, pointed out in some way by all the case 
firms, is the fit between the particular market requirements and the expertise and technology 
of the case firm. Beyond both being offshore markets, market characteristics caused by harsh 
environments, deep waters, long pipelines or strict environmental requirements are considered 
to suit the case firms’ own resources and capabilities. These are characteristics of the 
Norwegian offshore market, so the case firms point out that this fit applies to most products 
and services developed in the North Sea. The rationale for market selection in this case, is that 
the firm seeks to utilize its own resources and capabilities where these are most likely to yield 
competitive advantage. This rationale is based on a resource-based view. 
The industry expert also perceive that firms consider this fit between firm resources and 
market characteristics or basin characteristics, as he more specifically terms it, as an important 
part of the rationale for market selection. 
The particular case of strict environmental requirements in the host country causing the 
market to be attractive, can be seen as an interplay between resource-based and institution-
based factors, because the characteristic that fits the resource base of the firm in this case is 
induced by the formal institutions of the host country, more specifically the environmental 
regulations.  
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Competitive intensity 
The assessment of the competitive intensity in Australia and Brazil is not emphasizes as 
particularly significant in the market selection process. Indeed, it is clearly subordinate to the 
above mentioned aspects. Competitive intensity was however mentioned by NorSea and 
Eureka. NorSea found the competitive intensity to be high in Australia, while Eureka assessed 
it to be reasonably low within its particular niche. The industry expert similarly mentioned 
competitive intensity as part of the country screening process of firms, but subordinate to the 
above mentioned aspects. 
The institutional context 
The main purpose of this study is to understand how firm reasoning and decision-making are 
influenced by the institutions of the host country, and how this relates to the other influences. 
The empirical results show that with regard to the rationale for market selection, the pros and 
cons of the institutional environment are clearly of secondary importance to the case firms, 
particularly compared to the market potential. 
The data confirm however that institutions do matter, also with regard to the rationale for 
selecting, or not selecting, a particular market. KOGT had made clear efforts towards 
understanding the institutional environments prior to entry, and this affected both the 
consideration of whether to select the markets and the timing of market entry. NorSea 
ultimately excluded Brazil due to an assessment of its political uncertainty. For the same 
reason, KOGT excluded other markets with high potential, namely Africa, Russia and China. 
Aker Solutions particularly emphasizes one institutional regulation, namely that of local 
content, as being a critical precondition for its operations in Brazil.  
Eureka paid little attention to the institutional environment prior to entry, and admitted in 
retrospect that it proved very important. 
The aspects of the institutional environment emphasized by the case firms at this stage are 
mostly formal. Thus, formal institutions such as regulations (e.g. tax systems and local 
content requirements), legal systems and political stability seem to be considered more 
relevant than informal institutions with regard to the rationale for market selection. 
Most of these institution-based considerations come from assessments of the Brazilian 
market. All companies assessed Australia to be straight forward for market entry with regard 
to the institutional environment. In essence the firms to a large degree assumed the institutions 
in Australia to be well known and properly functioning, and therefore did not pay much 
attention to them prior to entry. However, NorSea and Aker Solutions mention particularly 
strict labor unions and pressures towards the use of local labor in Australia, but this is 
nonetheless not interpreted as influencing the rationale for market selection to a large degree. 
Rather, it seems that the case firms consider this manageable in Australia. 
In Brazil on the other hand, formal institutions directly influenced KOGT’s assessment of the 
market and timing of entry, NorSea’s decision to put Brazil on hold, Aker Solutions’ very 
nature of operations (i.e. intensive local production) and Eureka’s post-entry reduction of 
focus on the Brazilian market. 
The industry expert describes that firms often initially assess the ease of doing business in the 
country on a general level, and then on the next level of country screening take into account 
the practical challenges to entry such as laws and regulations. His perception is that both these 
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countries are favorable with regard to ease of doing business in general, but that the major 
differences appear on the next level of country screening. While Australia is considered 
straight-forward, Brazil is considered highly complicated due to institutional conditions such 
as local content regulations. Thus, his experience largely supports the analysis of the case 
firms. In addition to local content regulations, the industry expert highlights Brazil’s implicit 
protectionist attitude, which is part of informal institutions, and the contract approach of the 
largest customer Petrobras as institutionally based challenges to entry in Brazil. 
The approach taken in this study is to vary the institutional context to investigate the change 
in influence by institutions. In summary, the analysis demonstrates that in Brazil, where 
institutions are more complicated, market selection is affected by institutions to a larger 
degree than in Australia, where institutions are considered more straight-forward. The most 
significant aspects of the institutional context are regulations and political stability. 
Regulations directly form the central preconditions for doing business in the foreign market, 
as is the case with local content regulations in Brazil. Political stability strongly affects the 
risk of investing in the foreign market. If the country is associated with political uncertainty, 
as was the case for NG in Brazil, this renders firms averse to market entry. 
 
5.2 Choice of entry mode 
All the entry modes actually executed in Australia and Brazil by the case firms in this study 
are wholly-owned subsidiaries. However, other entry modes were considered, and in the case 
of NorSea in Brazil, a joint venture was selected, but not materialized. Moreover, the analysis 
indicates that beyond the choice between the generic categories of entry modes, such as the 
five generic entry modes presented in 2.1.2 (i.e. export, licensing/franchising, alliance, joint 
venture and wholly-owned subsidiary), the ultimate level of resource commitment and control 
involved in the entry mode varies substantially. The institutional environment seems to affect 
the ultimate level of resource commitment, but not so much the choice between the generic 
entry modes. 
Proximity to the customers 
The empirical data of this study suggest that a fundamental objective of the entry mode is to 
be close to the customers. This is clearly emphasized by Aker Solutions and KOGT, but also 
mentioned by NG and Eureka. In the case of Aker Solutions in Australia, it is claimed to be a 
demand of the customers that Aker Solutions is locally present, and not through an 
intermediary. KOGT sees it as difficult to achieve the necessary proximity to the customer 
without establishing a subsidiary, because these two countries are physically so far away from 
Norway. 
Nature of the business 
The objective to be close to the customers can be seen in relation to the nature of the case 
firms’ businesses. Aker Solutions in Australia argues that the level of high technology 
involved in its offerings affects its need for proximity to customers. In the case of NorSea 
Group in Australia, it relies on a set of routines and procedures (i.e. its expertise) in its 
logistics projects, and keeping that at the core of its local business dictates the use of a local 
subsidiary. KOGT and Eureka delivers high technology products and services and describes 
that its products require significant customization upon delivery. This is also true for Aker 
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Solutions. As explicitly admitted by KOGT, establishing a wholly-owned subsidiary seem to 
be a primary choice, or default entry mode, for these case firms when entering foreign 
markets. The case firms are all oil service companies. They offer high technology products 
and/or complex and specialized services. It is important to bear this in mind when analyzing 
their entry mode decisions since these may be aspects the firms themselves take for granted 
and do not articulate during the interviews. The industry expert gives further support to this, 
as he states that a wholly-owned subsidiary is usually established during market entry in this 
industry. 
Size of foreign business – gradually increasing resource commitment  
As argued by Aker Solutions in Brazil, which is the largest foreign business considered in this 
sample, the size of the foreign business is also an important catalyst for the wholly-owned 
subsidiary as an entry mode. It is argued that when foreign operations reach a certain size it is 
more profitable and efficient to operate a local subsidiary. KOGT further demonstrates this in 
a gradual manner, as it first exported or promoted its products from Norway, and then decided 
to establish a subsidiary when the size of the foreign business was deemed significant enough. 
A similar reasoning can be observed by Eureka in Australia, which after having exported for a 
while is now establishing a subsidiary. 
The institutional context 
The influence of institutions is observed across all case companies, not as being the reason for 
choosing a wholly-owned subsidiary, but more so when it comes to the reasoning around the 
alternative entry modes and the ultimate level of resource commitment involved in the entry 
mode. The industry expert also describes that market entry in this industry usually involves 
some form of wholly-owned subsidiary, but that the extent of resource commitment can vary 
significantly and is affected by the institutional environment. 
In Australia the institutional environment is considered such that the case firms are free to 
choose their otherwise preferred entry mode choice. In other words, the institutions are 
assumed away, and assumed to serve in a well known and properly functioning manner, such 
that the firms see no need to consider other modes than their generally preferred one. 
Institutions are explicitly stated not to have influenced the considerations around the entry 
mode choice in Australia by NG and Eureka. 
In Brazil on the other hand, alternative entry modes were to a larger degree considered by the 
case firms due to institutional complexities. Both direct regulations on supply base operations 
and the general desire for a strong local partner, caused NG to pursue joint venture as the 
entry mode. KOGT could utilize the experience and infrastructure of a group affiliated 
company, but admits that it otherwise would have spent more time trying to find an agent or a 
partner in Brazil, and emphasizes that considering alternative entry modes is more important 
in Brazil due to institutional complexities.  
Local content seems to be the single most important institutional influence in Brazil. In 
particular it dictates, not only the necessity for a local subsidiary, but the scope and scale i.e. 
the extent of resource commitment associated with the subsidiary. This is particularly evident 
from the cases of Aker Solutions and Eureka. Aker Solutions has slightly larger revenues in 
Brazil than in Australia, but has invested substantially more resources in its Brazilian 
operations due to local content regulations, more precisely 23 times the level of non-current 
assets, 17 times the capital expenditure and 9 times as many employees. This is a clear 
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example of how companies adapt substantially to host country institutions, even though the 
generic entry mode in this case is the same. The resource commitment is substantially higher 
in Brazil due to local content regulations. 
Another aspect highlighted by KOGT regarding both markets, but primarily Brazil, is the 
importance of demonstrating a long-term mindset to achieve a good reputation in the market. 
This is a cultural aspect, part of the informal institutions, which has implications for the 
choice of entry mode in that it requires a certain robustness. It is considered important to 
avoid having to back out and send unfortunate signals to the market. In other words, the host 
country’s culture of demanding a long-term mindset from suppliers and partners influence 
entrants towards a more resource committing market entry. 
The industry expert is of the impression that firms tend to establish a “light touch” entry mode 
in Australia and a “heavy touch” entry mode in Brazil, though there is usually a wholly-
owned subsidiary in both cases. He argues that the reasons for this difference in resource 
commitment are differences in the institutional contexts. More specifically, while regulatory 
conditions allow a light entry in Australia, the Brazilian market demands a heavy local 
presence. This is due to direct local content requirements, and import and export taxes, but 
also due to what the industry expert refers to as implicit local content requirements, which are 
attitudes and expectations that Brazilian firms take leading positions – a protectionist 
sentiment. These are part of informal institutions and exist in the norms and values of the 
Brazilian people. This is in line with the long-term mindset and reputation that KOGT 
describes as important in Brazil. The experience of the industry expert thus largely supports 
the analysis of the case firms. 
In summary, the analysis indicates that the choice between the generic entry modes (i.e. the 
choice to establish a wholly-owned subsidiary) is largely determined by factors other than the 
institutional environment. The ultimate level of resource commitment and control, however, 
may vary substantially and is to a large degree affected by both formal and informal 
institutions. A heavier local presence and therefore a higher level of resource commitment are 
required in the Brazilian market, both due to formal regulations and informal values and 
attitudes. 
5.3 Staffing and establishing foreign operations 
Costs and time spent 
The empirical data, particularly from the Aker Solutions case, demonstrate that it is expensive 
to operate in the oil and gas industry in both Australia and Brazil. In Australia it is expensive 
due to a high general price level as a result of a tight labor market, particularly within oil and 
gas but also in general. A tight labor market making it expensive to find skilled personnel is 
just as evident in the case of the oil and gas industry in Brazil, but there the costs of operating 
are further increased as a result of institution-based transaction costs. These are caused by a 
much more bureaucratic and time-consuming institutional environment, such as the tax 
system, certification processes, poor infrastructure, language barriers etc. 
The impression of KOGT, NG and Eureka is that the costs and time it takes to establish 
foreign operations are greater in Brazil than in Australia. This is caused by the challenges and 
complexities of the institutional environment. In particular, understanding regulations, the tax 
system, bureaucracy and culture takes time and requires resources, often external advisors. 
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Recruiting and the use of expatriates  
Another aspect highlighted by KOGT regarding both markets, but primarily Brazil, is the 
importance of a reputation to be successful in recruiting. Again, this is a cultural aspect and 
part of the informal institutions. Brazilian individuals are particularly concerned about the 
reputation of their employer. This makes recruiting challenging for a small, newly established 
player in the Brazilian market. KOGT however emphasizes the importance of finding the 
right people in the initial phase. 
When it comes to staffing strategy and the aspect of choosing whether to employ expatriates 
of the parent company or local workers, Aker Solutions, KOGT and NG all express a general 
preference for local employees, but emphasize that a certain element of expatriates from the 
parent company is also important. The reasons for having expatriates are twofold. One reason 
is to facilitate the pure transfer of knowledge, such as expertise that is better developed in 
Norway than in the subsidiaries. In practice this involves sending Norwegian specialists of 
certain business or technology areas to the host country to work for the subsidiary. For this 
purpose of knowledge transfer, there is no particular difference in the need for parent 
company expatriates between Australia and Brazil. 
The other reason expressed by KOGT and Aker Solutions is to facilitate control over the 
subsidiary. KOGT, which only has one expatriate, namely the top manager in Brazil, states 
that for the purpose of control expatriates are more relevant in Brazil than in Australia. This is 
interpreted as being based on institutional complexities in Brazil. Aker Solutions argues that 
expatriates exert control over the subsidiary simply by bringing the business culture of the 
parent company, and also believes that this is more important in Brazil than in Australia. A 
country’s common business culture is part of its informal institutions. 
Both KOGT and NG successfully established subsidiaries in Australia without the use of 
expatriates, while Eureka staffed its Brazilian subsidiary purely with locally contracted human 
resources. This proved to be a less satisfactory solution. This may further indicate that a 
certain degree of control, gained through the use of parent company expatriates, is particularly 
important in Brazil. 
As mentioned, the case companies demonstrate a general preference for local employees in 
both markets. In Australia this is driven by the assessment that local employees are better 
equipped with local market knowledge and contacts. The institutional environment of 
Australia is not mentioned in this regard. In Brazil on the other hand, the need for Brazilian 
employees is emphasized due to the language barrier, the complexity and bureaucracy of its 
institutions and the local content requirements. These are all institutional aspects. 
5.4 Perceived successfulness of market entry 
KOGT perceived its market entry processes in both Australia and Brazil to be very successful. 
They spent less time and money than expected on establishing a profitable operation and did 
not encounter disrupting obstacles along the way. KOGT was also the case firm that was most 
clearly familiar with the institutional environments of the host countries and the 
corresponding challenges, prior to market entry. It proceeded with patience and reduced the 
risks along the way by waiting for the first contracts to be signed, justifying a robust 
establishment and then gradually increasing resource commitment with a flexible and scalable 
mindset. Due to the expected challenges of the institutional environment and corresponding 
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costs, the Brazil entry was withheld until the revenues in Brazil could justify a market entry 
that would not subsequently have to be withdrawn. 
Eureka, on the contrary, seemed to establish a subsidiary in Brazil with less attention paid to 
and respect for the institutional environment. This proved less successful, as Eureka more 
than two years later still has not properly entered the Brazilian market. Eureka emphasizes 
that local content regulations are its most critical obstacle. 
NG chose to put its Brazil entry on hold due to the institutional environment, more precisely 
the political uncertainty associated with Brazil. It feared to invest heavily in permanent 
infrastructure with the risk of laws and regulations changing in Brazil such that NG’s 
investments would deteriorate. It is impossible to assess whether this would actually happen 
or not, but being familiar with and responsive to the particular institutional environment 
allows NG to make an informed decision and avoid the possibility of a catastrophic loss. 
Aker Solutions is not satisfied with its position in the Australian market, but clearly states that 
there has been an internal lack of stability and focus on the Australian business, and that this 
is about to change. It emphasizes however that this unsatisfactory performance is not caused 
by challenges posed by the institutional environment in Australia. In Brazil, Aker Solutions 
has invested heavily and committed substantial resources. It has taken the local content 
requirements very seriously and located a significant portion of its world-wide production in 
Brazil. It has been operating in Brazil for a long time, has a large number of local employees 
and a vast amount of local knowledge, also about the institutional environment and its 
corresponding challenges. Aker Solutions describes recent years in Brazil as successful in that 
it has built a strong position, a large local organization and has been awarded large contracts. 
It has however experienced problems, particularly in 2011 when it incurred losses of 500 
million NOK in Brazil which caused the replacement of its Brazilian management and a 
strengthening of the parent company’s control through the use of expatriates. A main reason 
for the losses in 2011 was that quality problems were not properly reported and addressed 
when they should have been. Though not explicitly admitted by Aker Solutions, this lack of 
capability to properly address problems may be a cultural challenge in Brazil necessitating a 
higher degree of control from the parent company. 
In summary, the empirical data indicates that companies that pay deliberate attention to the 
institutional environment and understand its corresponding challenges are more likely to be 
successful in entering foreign markets, particularly where the institutional environment is 
challenging such as in emerging markets. Furthermore, having an initial business to build on 
and gradually increasing resource commitment as the business grows, seems to be a desirable 
approach. This view is shared by the industry expert. 
All firms were also asked directly which of the two markets they ultimately consider most 
challenging to enter. The answers are clear. Regardless of their own success or failure, all 
companies in the sample find Brazil more challenging for market entry than Australia, and 
aspects of the institutional environment, such as laws, regulations, particularly local content, 
bureaucracy, political instability, culture and language are highlighted as main reasons for this 
difference. KOGT highlights the time and energy spent on understanding regulations, taxes, 
culture, recruitment etc. NG emphasized the uncertainties regarding future laws and 
regulations. Aker Solutions pointed to the lack of infrastructure, general bureaucracy and tax 
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systems, and the lack of educated labor force as main challenges. Eureka emphasized local 
content regulations. 
The industry expert also states that Brazil in sum is a more challenging market to enter due to 
local content requirements, both explicit and implicit, but he is also of the perception that 
Brazil holds an even bigger potential than Australia for those firms that succeed with market 
entry. 
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6 Discussion 
This section returns to the theoretical propositions developed in 2.4 and discusses these 
propositions in light of the empirical data from the cases, the expert interview and the cross-
case analysis. It then discusses implications for theory, managers and policy makers. Lastly, 
limitations of the study are discussed. 
6.1 Returning to the theoretical propositions 
6.1.1 The institutional context affects entry strategies – particularly in emerging 
markets 
The first theoretical proposition addresses how host country institutions, in general, affect 
entry strategies: 
Proposition 1 (P1): 
The institutional context of the host country affects firms’ reasoning and decision-
making with respect to foreign market entry i.e. firms’ foreign market entry strategies. 
The second theoretical proposition extends this by comparing emerging and developed 
economy contexts: 
Proposition 2 (P2): 
The effects of the host country’s institutional context on foreign market entry strategies 
are more significant in emerging economies than in developed economies. 
The empirical data and the cross-case analysis indicate that there are significant differences 
between the two countries. The approach taken by this study to examine the influence of 
institutions on foreign market entry strategies, is to compare the reasoning and decision-
making of the firms across differing institutional contexts. In other words, the differences 
between the countries are used to investigate how institutions affect entry strategies in 
general. It is therefore considered most appropriate to discuss these first two propositions 
together. In the following, proposition 1 and 2 are discussed with respect to each aspect of the 
foreign market entry process. 
Rationale for market selection 
With regard to the rationale for market selection, some firms employ a systematic country 
screening process for all potential countries for market entry, in which aspects of the 
institutional context are considered. Institutional aspects are however far from the main 
drivers of the rationale for market selection. 
The analysis indicates that there are significant differences between the influence of 
institutions on the rationale for market selection between Australia and Brazil – a developed 
and an emerging economy. When considering market entry into the developed economy 
Australia, firms assume the institutional environment away as background, assuming that the 
host country’s institutional environment is familiar, stable and market supporting. Not much 
attention is therefore given to the host country’s institutional environment at this stage. The 
analysis indicates that the ultimate decision of whether or not to enter developed economies 
does not explicitly rest on institution-based considerations. Rather other influences are more 
significant, which will be discussed further in relation to proposition 5. However, some firms 
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do employ systematic country screening processes, in which institutional aspects are 
considered.  
In Brazil, on the other hand, the picture is different. The description of Brazil through the case 
firms largely corresponds to the description of emerging markets in the theoretical 
background of this thesis. Legal, political and societal institutions are considered different, 
less market oriented and less stable than in developed economies. The cases from Brazil 
indicate that when firms consider entering emerging economies, institutions become relevant 
for the reasoning and decision-making. Most significant in the case of Brazil seems to be local 
content regulations and political uncertainty. The analysis indicates that the institutional 
context in some cases can be the “deal breaking” factor ultimately preventing market 
selection, as was the case for NG in Brazil, where the political uncertainty was considered too 
high and ultimately prevented market selection. Thus, firms consider the institutions in 
emerging economies to pose challenges and increase risk, costs and the time it takes to enter 
the market, causing firms to be more averse to market entry. 
This demonstrates that the institutional context is a much more explicit influence when firms 
consider entering an emerging economy than when they consider entering a developed 
economy. This however does not mean that the institutional context does not matter for 
market selection in developed economies. The very fact that their institutional contexts are 
assumed away as background is an implicit acknowledgement that the firms consider their 
institutional contexts favorable, which increases the attractiveness of the market and the 
likelihood of the market being selected. As McMillan (2007) argues, where institutions are 
favorable they are invisible, it is the absence of strong market-supporting institutions that is 
“conspicuous”, which is the case in emerging economies, and in Brazil in this case. Even 
though the institutional environment implicitly affects the rationale for market selection in 
general, it is mainly when considering emerging economies that institutions are explicitly 
assessed and considered. 
The lack of explicit attention to the institutional context in considering market entry in general 
however highlights a potential weakness, both because firms are increasingly exposed to 
emerging and developing countries and because differences in institutional contexts may also 
exist between developed economies. Market selection under the implicit assumption that the 
institutional context of the host country is sufficiently familiar, stable and market-supporting 
may not be adequate in the long-term. It is certainly not a risk reducing practice, as firms may 
be surprised by challenges posed by the institutional context that could and should have been 
foreseen. 
Another consequence of this lack of explicit consideration of the institutional context with 
regard to market selection, is that the potential advantages of certain countries’ institutional 
context is largely ignored. In other words, if the institutional context of potential markets is 
only explicitly considered due to its deficiencies or challenges countries which are 
particularly easy to enter due to their institutional context are not appropriately considered. 
Institutional contexts only decrease the attractiveness of markets, they don’t increase it. 
In summary, the discussion provides moderate support for Proposition 1 and strong support 
for Proposition 2 with respect to rationale for market selection. The host country’s 
institutional environment more significantly influences the decision of whether or not to enter 
a market in the case of emerging economies than in the case of developed economies. This 
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discussion provides valuable insight into how the institutional environment affects the 
rationale for market selection, which is the main objective of this study. In developed 
economies, the institutional context is treated as background and assumed to be familiar, 
stable and market-supporting, thus very limitedly being assessed explicitly, while in emerging 
economies institutional aspects are explicitly assessed and in some cases prevent market 
selection. The institutional aspects that most significantly affects the rationale for market 
selection seems to be formal institutions, and in the case of Brazil, local content regulations 
and political uncertainty. 
Choice of entry mode 
The analysis indicates that the choice between the generic entry modes is based on factors 
other than the institutional environment, which is further discussed in 6.1.4. Even though a 
wholly-owned subsidiary is chosen, the ultimate level of resource commitment may vary 
substantially and the entry mode may involve a light or heavy local presence. The analysis 
indicates that the institutional environment significantly influences this level of resource 
commitment, though not being the main reason for the choice between the generic entry 
modes itself. 
The main determinants of the firms’ preference for wholly-owned subsidiaries are proximity 
to customers, the nature of the business and the size of the foreign business. Institutional 
influence is thus not found to drive the choice of entry mode per se, if one merely considers 
the choice between the generic entry modes (e.g. export, licensing/franchising, alliance, joint 
venture and wholly-owned subsidiary). However, entry mode is about the level of control and 
resource commitment of the foreign governance structure, and institutions are indeed found to 
influence this level. Moreover, institutions are found to significantly influence the scope and 
scale of the foreign operations, i.e. the intensiveness of the local presence. In the specific case 
of local content regulations, these clearly dictate the way firms operate. In Brazil where local 
content regulations are strict compared to Australia, companies establish a more intensive 
local presence. They make larger investments, build larger organizations and locate more 
activities in the host country to meet regulatory requirements. In Australia, firms consider it 
sufficient to establish a light presence, typically with a local sales organization and perhaps 
selected parts of the product or service value chain, but not a substantial production, because 
this is not required by the regulatory institutions. 
There is an informal or cultural aspect of the pressure for local content as well, which also 
positively affects the degree of resource commitment in the host country. In Brazil, the culture 
is such that firms must demonstrate a long-term local mindset to be attractive in the market. 
This is a result of a protectionist culture in Brazil, emphasizing local presence, which is 
manifested both in formal rules and regulations but also in informal norms and values of 
individuals. This can be seen as an informal extension of the local content regulations 
(referred to by the industry expert as implicit local content). Firms seek local legitimacy of 
their operations by establishing an intensive local presence, in addition to merely adhering to 
formal rules and regulations. 
With regard to the sheer choice between the generic entry modes, this is as stated above 
largely determined by other factors, but the analysis also reveals cases in which institutions 
influence the sheer choice of between the entry modes. However, this is only in Brazil – an 
emerging economy. In the developed economy Australia, the analysis indicates that firms 
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assume an institutional context such that they are free to select their otherwise preferred entry 
mode. In emerging economies, institutional bureaucracy may pose requirements which are 
more appropriately met by alternative entry modes, as was the case for NG in Brazil, where 
land with an environmental license was needed to operate a supply base, which rendered 
acquisition or joint venture more viable entry modes. The analysis also indicated that firms 
generally deem it more necessary to consider alternative entry modes in emerging economies 
compared to developed economies, due to less familiar, less stable and less market-supporting 
institutional environments. 
In summary, moderate support is found for Proposition 1 with respect to the aspect of entry 
mode choice. The choice of entry mode itself is not driven by institutional influences, but the 
ultimate level of control and resource commitment of the foreign business is clearly affected 
by both formal regulations and informal pressures. Furthermore, firms are more inclined to 
consider alternative entry modes in emerging economies than in developed economies. 
Proposition 2 is again strongly supported, as firms consider the institutional context to a 
greater degree with regard to the entry mode choice in emerging economies than in developed 
economies. 
Staffing and establishing foreign operations  
Next, this thesis set out to uncover how institutions affect aspects related to staffing and 
establishing foreign operations in Australia and Brazil. More specifically it focuses on the 
costs and the time it takes to set up foreign operations, and the choice between expatriates and 
local employees. 
Both in Australia and Brazil skilled labor is difficult to get hold of and expensive. The oil and 
gas industries in both countries are characterized by a high demand for skilled labor and a 
shortage of qualified workers. This of course directly affects the establishment costs of an 
entrant firm. However, there is an important difference in the nature of the costs between the 
countries, and more specifically the degree of influence of host country institutions on these 
costs. 
In Australia, the main costs are a direct consequence of the high price level, particularly the 
tight labor market. To a certain degree, this is influenced by a tradition for strong labor unions 
and strict regulations making it difficult for Australian companies to use foreign labor. 
In Brazil, in addition to high costs of educated labor, the major cost hurdles are caused by 
“friction” in the market system such as regulations (e.g. local content, import and export tax), 
required certifications and approvals and general bureaucracy, including delays and the 
amount of time required to get things done. These “friction” or transaction costs are to a large 
degree associated with deficiencies of the country’s institutional environment. Institutions 
establish the rules of the game and support the functioning of the market. When institutions 
are defective, unstable and/or bureaucratic, this increases the costs of establishing and 
operating in the foreign market, and these are significantly higher in Brazil than in Australia, 
and often higher in emerging economies than in developed economies, as the description in 
2.2 of the Theoretical background indicates. The fact that costs to a larger degree are driven 
by indirect transaction costs caused by institutional deficiencies also increases the risk of 
setting up foreign operations in emerging economies, since these costs are more difficult to 
understand and correctly calculate in advance as well as potentially being unstable and 
changing over time. 
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When it comes to staffing the foreign subsidiary, a general preference for local employees is 
evident in both markets, but a certain element of parent company expatriates is still 
emphasized for two reasons. First, parent company expatriates facilitate the pure transfer of 
knowledge. This can be company routines and procedure or specific technological expertise. 
This aspect is not found to be affected by host country institutions and no differences are 
found between developed and emerging markets, as this pure transfer of knowledge facilitated 
by the use of parent company expatriates is relevant both in Australia and Brazil. For the 
purpose of control, however, the institutions of the host countries come into play, and for this 
purpose the use of expatriates is more important in Brazil than in Australia. Expatriates from 
the parent company personify the business culture of the parent company and the home 
country, and is therefore an indirect way to facilitate control over the subsidiary. The rationale 
for this is that managers with the same business culture as the parent company is more likely 
to make decisions consistent with the parent company’s business culture. A larger cultural 
difference between the home and host countries therefore increase the need to use expatriates 
for the purpose of control. A country’s business culture is part of its informal institutions. 
From the perspective of entrant companies originating from developed countries, the use of 
expatriates to exert control over its subsidiaries is therefore more strongly influenced by the 
institutional context when entering emerging economies, because the cultural differences is 
usually higher.  
The need for local employees is important in both markets. However, in developed economies 
industry- and resource-based considerations such as local market knowledge and contact 
network are the main reasons for this preference of recruiting from the local market. In 
emerging economies on the other hand, institutional aspects such as the need to understand 
the complexity and bureaucracy of legal and regulatory authorities, in addition to language 
barriers and local content requirements, are important reasons for the need of local employees. 
With respect to staffing and establishing foreign operations, proposition 1 and 2 are thus 
strongly supported. Institutional deficiencies in emerging economies increase transaction 
costs, risk and the time it takes to set up foreign operations, while on the contrary, market-
supporting institutions in developed economies allow for inexpensive, predictable and 
efficient establishment. With regard to staffing, expatriates are more important for the purpose 
of control in emerging economies, due to larger discrepancies in business culture. 
Institutions influence market selection, choice of entry mode and foreign 
establishment – particularly in emerging markets 
In summary, Proposition 1 is moderately supported with respect to (1) rationale for market 
selection and (2) choice of entry mode, and strongly supported with respect to (3) staffing and 
establishing foreign operations, while Proposition 2 is strongly supported for all aspects of the 
market entry process considered. The institutional context influences entry strategy to a larger 
degree in emerging economies than in developed economies. This is because the institutions 
of emerging markets are less familiar, less stable and less market-supporting than those of 
developed economies, and therefore more evidently and explicitly force entrant firms to adapt 
their strategies. Well functioning institutional environments, on the other hand, are “invisible” 
and only limitedly affect entrant firms. However, questions can be raised about whether the 
treatment of the institutional context as mere background, even in developed economies, is 
adequate, both because firms are increasingly exposed to emerging and developing countries 
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and because differences in institutional contexts may also exist between developed 
economies. 
6.1.2 Emerging economies are more challenging to enter 
The discussion so far indicates that there are significant differences in the way host country 
institutions affect the entry strategies of entrant firms in emerging and developed economies, 
and further indicates that the magnitude of influence is far greater in emerging economies. 
The next proposition goes on to proclaim that this causes firms to experience a more 
challenging market entry process: 
Proposition 3 (P3): 
Due to the challenges posed by the host country’s institutional context firms find 
foreign market entry more challenging in emerging economies than in developed 
economies. 
This proposition was quite directly addressed in the empirical study, as the case firms which 
have all entered or tried to enter both Australia and Brazil, a developed and an emerging 
economy, were asked directly which one they consider most challenging to enter and why. 
The answers were undisputable. All firms found market entry in Brazil more challenging, 
some “of a whole other dimension”, and the firms pointed towards institutional complexities, 
requirements and uncertainties as reasons for this difference. The industry expert shares the 
view that Brazil is the most challenging market to enter. 
In the case of Brazil it is important to properly understand the institutional particularities such 
as local content, both explicit and implicit, import and export regulations and taxes, general 
bureaucracy and time-consuming approvals and processes and the language barrier. All this 
raises the costs and increases the time it takes to establish there. In addition, firms are more 
doubtful regarding the stability of the institutional environment e.g. laws and regulations. 
These aspects are included in the decision process leading to if and when to enter Brazil. 
Then, when entering, firms need to be aware of the demand for local presence, both formally 
though local content regulations and informally rooted in Brazilian culture, and adapt 
accordingly by establishing a robust local business to gain access to both labor and customers. 
In more general terms, when entering a new country-market, firms are inevitably confronted 
by its institutional environment. Entrant firms must abide by the host country’s rules and 
regulations, pay its taxes, follow its formal procedures (e.g. to register a company), deal with 
its culture and code of conduct, rely on its legal enforcement and trust its political 
predictability and stability. When institutional environments are familiar, transparent, stable 
and market oriented, all these things may be nearly formalities, and the main challenges of 
entering the market are likely to be firm- or industry-based. When institutional environments 
are unfamiliar, perhaps plagued by corruption and in reform towards a market-based system, 
sometimes characterized by unpredictable changes in market conditions, all these things need 
to be learned, experienced and understood, firms need to adapt accordingly and the main 
challenges may become dealing with the context itself. As presented in the theoretical 
background of this thesis and as illustrated by the empirical data in the case of Brazil, 
emerging markets typically resemble the latter case from the perspective of an entrant firm 
from a developed country. 
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Ultimately the friction that arises from confronting less familiar, less stable and less market-
supporting institutional environments make emerging markets more costly, time-consuming 
and risky to enter than developed economies. In other words, the empirical data and analysis 
clearly supports Proposition 3. 
6.1.3 Firms that take the institutional context into account are more successful in entry 
The next proposition seeks to address the performance implications of paying attention to and 
deliberately adapting to the host country’s institutional environment throughout the market 
entry process: 
Proposition 4 (P4): 
Firms that deliberately take the institutional context of the host country into account in 
their reasoning and decision-making with respect to foreign market entry are more 
likely to perceive the market entry process as successful. 
The cross-case analysis highlights KOGT as good example of a firm that has paid 
considerable attention to the challenges of the institutional environments prior to and during 
market entry, and has consequently achieved successful market entry processes. It had a good 
understanding of the particular challenges and costs associated with entering the markets, and 
sat tight and waited for the right moment to enter. When it had secured an income substantial 
enough to justify the costs of entry investments, it proceeded with care growing with a 
flexible and scalable mindset. KOGT hired local employees to achieve an appropriate level of 
local presence, but employed a Norwegian CEO in Brazil recognizing the additional need for 
control there. It paid attention to the informal pressures towards local presence as well as the 
formal ones, and further managed to operate in a way that accommodates the explicit local 
content requirements in Brazil while still retaining its intellectual property in Norway. Being 
aware that Brazil required further adaptation than Australia, KOGT proceeded accordingly 
and achieved similar entry success in the emerging market as in the developed market. 
On the contrary, Eureka seem to have entered Brazil with its attention focused on the booming 
market potential and its own technological advantages, and less attention paid to the 
adaptations and special treatment this market required for Eureka to get in position to sell its 
products. This did not lead to a break-through in the market within the first three years since 
establishing a subsidiary in Brazil.  
In more general terms, the empirical results and analysis indicate that firms that pay attention 
to, understand and adapt to the different business contexts of the markets they are entering, 
namely the institutional environments, are more likely to avoid the major pitfalls, avoid 
getting stuck, avoid losing money and ultimately avoid ending up unable to be competitive in 
the market. More specifically, this entails making an informed decision about whether and 
when to enter (with respect to rationale for market selection), establishing an appropriate local 
presence (with respect to choice of entry mode), and effectively building a local organization 
and getting in position for business (with respect to staffing and establishing foreign 
operations). On the contrary, treating all country-markets in the same way, not acknowledging 
the institutional dimension, can potentially lead to market selection for the wrong reasons, an 
inappropriate level of control and local presence, and getting stuck in the establishment phase, 
not getting hold of the human resources needed, spending too much money and the time and 
energy of key employees in merely setting up business operations. 
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Thus, Proposition 4 is supported by the empirical findings of this study. Firms that 
deliberately include the institutional environment in its strategic considerations are more 
likely to perceive the entry process as successful. 
6.1.4 Institutions influence entry strategies in interplay with other influences 
The final proposition considers the institutional influences in comparison and conjunction to 
other influences: 
Proposition 5 (P5): 
The effects of the host country’s institutional context on foreign market entry may be of 
lesser or greater significance than other influences, such as transaction-cost-based, 
industry-based and resource-based influences, and may moderate or enhance such 
other influences. 
Rationale for market selection 
Institutions are by no means the first thing that comes to mind when discussing the rationale 
of market selection. On the contrary, there is no doubt that the market potential, specifically 
the market size and growth, is both the starting point and arguably the most influential aspect 
considered in the pre-entry assessment of potential markets. Nonetheless, in the case of the 
emerging economy Brazil, contextual aspects such as political uncertainty and local content 
regulations significantly affected the decision of whether and when to enter. This tells us 
something about how institutions influence the entry decision. Firms do not initially consider 
“what markets have a favorable institutional environment?” and then continue to consider 
“are these markets large with strong growth?” It is clearly the other way around. Countries are 
considered for market selection because of their market size and growth, and only then are 
other factors, such as the institutional context, considered. 
Among other factors, the degree of fit between firm resources and market characteristics is a 
significant aspect considered. Firms seek to exploit and develop their own unique resources 
and capabilities in foreign markets, and therefore look for markets well suited for this. An 
interesting example of the interplay between such a resource-based aspect and the institutional 
context are the strict environmental requirements that attract Norwegian oil service 
companies. In this case, it is the institutional environment that accommodates a condition that 
for certain companies constitute an advantage. The technology, products and services 
developed for the North Sea, where environmental regulations have been strict, suit these 
markets because the institutions there put similar emphasis on environmental concerns. 
When a potential market has successfully passed these two aspects and is considered a market 
with a large potential and characteristics well suitable to the firm’s resource-base, that is when 
institutions come into play. Again, institutional aspects are not the starting point for pre-entry 
market assessment, but rather enter the process, particularly in the case of emerging markets, 
and may in some cases strongly affect the outcome. In other words, institutional aspects are 
moderating or enhancing firms’ assessment of the markets rather than forming the sheer basis 
for the attractiveness of the market. However, if institutional aspects are considered highly 
unfavorable, they certainly do affect the outcome as argued above in the case of market entry 
being discontinued or postponed due to unfavorable institutional environments. 
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Choice of entry mode 
As pointed out earlier, the aspects found to considerably drive the choice of entry mode are 
the desire for proximity to customers, the nature of the business and the size of the foreign 
business, which are somewhat related factors. This study focuses on the oil service industry, 
where products and services are usually high-tech and complex and require significant 
customization and follow-up to a relatively small number of large customers. In a transaction 
cost view, this high-tech nature of the business translates to high asset specificity and a large 
size of foreign operations with a small number of key customers translates to high task 
frequency. This calls for a hierarchical governance structure of the transactions (Williamson, 
1985), which entails being close to the customers and entering through a high-control entry 
mode. 
The desire for proximity to customers can also be viewed from a resource-based perspective. 
In an industry where advanced and specialized technology is important, highly customized to 
key customers, the close customer relationship becomes a critical vehicle in exploiting and 
further developing resource-based competitive advantages (e.g. technology and expertise). By 
working close with customers, learning from them and about their needs, firms can acquire 
and develop resources and capabilities that are rare, valuable and imperfectly imitable, and 
thereby enhance its competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). Thus, a resource-based view also 
predicts a high-control entry mode. 
So transaction-based and resource-based aspects are instrumental in determining the choice 
between the different entry modes, which often results in a high-control mode like wholly-
owned subsidiary in the case of high-tech oil service companies as the case firms also 
illustrated. Then, beyond the sheer entry mode choice, the institutional context becomes 
relevant and influences the ultimate level of control and local presence, as discussed in 
relation to Proposition 1 and 2. In other words, with respect to the choice of entry mode, as 
with rationale for market selection, institutional aspects seem to enter the decision-making 
process later than other influences, but can significantly alter and dictate the ultimate 
outcome, particularly in emerging economies. 
Staffing and establishing foreign operations  
With respect to the establishment of foreign operations, it was pointed out in the discussion of 
Proposition 1 and 2 that the main costs and challenges associated with setting up business 
operations in emerging economies to a large degree were caused by friction due to market 
deficiencies. This is an example of the interplay between transaction cost-theory and 
institutional theory, as was also touched upon in the theoretical background of this thesis. 
Transaction costs arise from market imperfections, and the institutional environment of a 
country constitutes the “rules of the game” of the market. Therefore, its deficiencies result in 
transaction costs. As states by Meyer (2001), "institutions reduce transaction costs by 
reducing uncertainty and establishing a stable structure to facilitate interactions." The 
empirical results of this thesis attest this, as the familiar, stable and market-supporting 
institutions of Australia reduce transaction costs, while the deficiencies (e.g. bureaucracy, lack 
of infrastructure, local content regulations etc.) increase transaction costs associated with 
establishing in Brazil. 
Another aspect addressed in this thesis is the choice between expatriates and local employees. 
It is found that the use of expatriates was important for two reasons, namely to exert control 
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over the foreign subsidiary and to facilitate the pure transfer of knowledge between 
headquarters and the subsidiary. For the purpose of gaining control, the use of expatriates is 
important due to informal aspects of the institutional context, more specifically to manifest 
the business culture of the parent company in the foreign organization. This is found to be 
more important in emerging economies, due to the likelihood of larger cultural differences. 
However, the other rationale for the use of expatriates is not at all related to institutions, but 
can rather be understood with a resource-based view, as firms seek to manage and exploit its 
specific resources (e.g. technology, expertise and know-how) in foreign markets and learn 
from and develop resources in foreign markets.  
Institutions influence entrant firms in interplay with other factors 
This discussion illustrates how the institutional context influences foreign market entry 
relative to other influences. Indeed, there is a significant interplay between industry-, 
transaction-cost-, resource- and institution-based aspects, which affect entrant firms’ decision-
making at different stages, to different extents and in different ways throughout the market 
entry process. This study indicates that rationale for market selection is driven by the market 
potential, an industry-based aspect, but significantly altered and influenced by the institutional 
context, particularly in emerging economies. The choice of entry mode is driven by 
transaction-cost and/or resource-based considerations and similarly altered and influenced by 
the institutional context. Thus, with respect to these two parts of the market entry process, 
institutional considerations are not the starting point, perhaps neither the most decisive 
influence, but nevertheless a significant determinant of the final outcome, again, particularly 
in emerging economies. With respect to setting up foreign business operations, the differences 
between the main costs and challenges in emerging and developed economies are largely 
transaction costs that arise from the institutional deficiencies in emerging economies, 
exemplifying an interplay between institution-based and transaction-cost factors. 
Ultimately, the discussion provides support for and a deeper understanding of Proposition 5, 
and further illustrates the importance of striving for a holistic and integrative view based on 
several theoretical perspectives, or at least not being blind to other influences when focusing 
on one particular perspective. 
6.2 Implications for theory 
Entry strategy research must consider institutions – not only in emerging markets  
The institution-based perspective has gained momentum within entry strategy research in 
recent years due to the increasing significance of emerging markets. This study demonstrates 
that institutions play a larger role in emerging markets and to a larger degree than in 
developed markets affect the strategic considerations and decisions of the entrant firm. Thus, 
this study provides further support to the request put forth by several researchers (Hoskisson 
et al., 2000, Wright et al., 2005, Meyer et al., 2009, Peng et al., 2009) that strategy research in 
emerging markets needs to consider the institutional context.  
Peng et al. (2009) however emphasize “the equally important ramifications of the institution-
based view for research on developed economies” and claim that the institution-based view is 
the “third leg of the strategy tripod” in a general sense, regardless of what countries are being 
studied. This study shares that view, even though the influence of developed country 
institutions were found to be very limited in this study. The importance of the institution-
based view for research on strategy in developed economies is clearly more difficult to see. 
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The answer however lies in the major differences across the two countries studied – one 
representative of developed and one of emerging economies. This study has demonstrated that 
holding firms equal, industry equal, products and services equal and overall strategy and 
international orientation of the firms equal across two markets with highly different 
institutional contexts, results in significant differences in the firms’ reasoning and decision-
making throughout the market entry process. This is what demonstrates the importance of 
never discriminating the context in which business strategy is taking place i.e. the institutional 
context. Simply speaking, what the study demonstrates is that two different institutional 
contexts require different adaptations from the entrant firm, and after all, even though 
developed country institutions often remain “invisible”, no two countries are exactly the 
same. The vast differences between developed and emerging economies provide researchers 
with a means to study and measure the effects of the institutional context, analogous to a 
magnifying glass, but the effects are nonetheless believed to be valid in general, although 
sometimes more subtle. Strategy research, and more specifically entry strategy research, 
should therefore always include the institutional context, certainly in emerging economies, but 
also in general. 
Emphasize multiple theoretical perspectives 
This study focuses on the institution-based perspective and indeed demonstrates the 
significance of this perspective. However, it also demonstrates that it is by no means sufficient 
on its own. Firms’ strategic decisions during the market entry process are influenced by 
several aspects, and far from all of these originate in the host country’s institutions. With 
respect to both the rationale for market selection and the choice of entry mode, the 
institutional environment seems to be secondary to other influences, such as industry-, 
transaction-cost- and resource-based factors, both in terms of the order and arguably the 
magnitude of influence. Institution-based considerations can however in some cases be 
powerful enough halt the whole market entry process, so their significance is undeniable. 
Furthermore, there is significant interplay between these different influential factors. One 
influence sometimes gives rise to another, or may moderate or enhance another. For example, 
institutions give rise to transaction costs and affect which resource-based advantages are most 
critical in a particular country-market. 
Studying the influence of institutions on the market entry process is thus necessary, but not 
sufficient to arrive at excellent research. Rather excellent research should strive to integrate 
the different theoretical perspectives and study the interplay between them, in order to render 
more applicable to firms’ actual situations, which inevitably involves navigating several 
sources of influence. If one however focuses on one or a few of the theoretical perspectives, 
one should always be aware of and open to the others to avoid misinterpreting the empirical 
data. 
Study the degree of local presence, not merely the entry mode  choice 
A majority of research on foreign market entry merely focuses on the choice of entry mode 
per se i.e. whether export, licensing, franchising, alliances, joint venture or wholly-owned 
subsidiary is used (Johnson and Tellis, 2008). The research is often quantitative, and thereby 
equates all entry strategies where the same entry mode, for example a wholly-owned 
subsidiary, is used. This study has demonstrated that the degree of control and resource 
commitment, which are usually the main attributes of an entry mode, can be substantially 
different even though the choice between the generic entry modes is the same. For 
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researchers, it is important to be aware of this, and for many purposes a more thorough 
description of the market entry than the usual classification of entry modes is needed. 
In the specific case of a wholly-owned subsidiary, which is generally attributed high control 
and high resource commitment, this study demonstrates that such an entry mode can be either 
“light weight” e.g. a sales office of one employee or “heavy weight” e.g. a 1500-employee 
organization with substantial local production. Further research should explore whether 
attributes such as the number or share of employees or the level of investment could be 
appropriately included in the description of entry modes, and otherwise how the entry mode 
literature can appropriately account for major differences within the existing classifications. 
Adopt a broader view of entry strategy  
Entry strategy research has traditionally focused largely or exclusively on the choice of entry 
mode (Sakarya et al., 2007), despite the influential definition of Root (1987) treating the 
choice of entry mode merely as one aspect of foreign market entry strategy. Several 
researchers have called for a more integrative view on entry strategy, e.g. Crick and Jones 
(2000) and Koch (2001). 
This study has taken a broader view on foreign market entry, from market selection to setting 
up foreign operations, and it demonstrates that interesting strategic reasoning and decision-
making arises besides the sheer choice of entry mode, and that this reasoning and decision-
making throughout the entry process is highly interrelated. The latter is probably best 
illustrated by the ultimate structure of the interviews, which set out to treat the different 
aspects of the entry process in a discrete manner, but ended up discussing them in a highly 
intertwined manner. 
Future research should seek to clarify the concept of foreign market entry strategy and the 
relationships between the included aspects. 
Focus on performance implications  of institutional responsiveness 
This study tries to explore the relationship between the firms’ attention paid to the 
institutional environment of the host country and their perceived successfulness of market 
entry. The findings indicate that attention paid to the institutional environment has a positive 
effect on market entry successfulness, but this obviously needs further investigation on a 
larger scale. Despite the increased momentum of institution-based research, particularly in 
emerging markets, there has been little focus on the performance implications of deliberately 
including the institutional dimension in strategic reasoning and decision-making. Future 
research should explore this relationship.  
6.3 Implications for managers 
One of the two main goals of this thesis was to extract knowledge and learn from the case 
firms’ market entry processes in Australia and Brazil. The experiences of the case firms and 
the analysis and discussion of this thesis provide several implications for managers. 
Don’t be blinded by the glittering market potential – consider institutions too 
Firms look for large markets with strong growth. That is reasonable, but one shouldn’t make 
the entry decision just yet. There are other aspects to consider. The institutional environment 
varies significantly between countries and poses significantly different challenges to market 
entry. Underestimating the implications of the host country’s institutional environment can 
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turn into a costly endeavor. Particularly emerging markets often have institutions, both formal 
such as laws and regulations and informal such as norms and culture, that are less familiar, 
less stable and less market-supporting than developed economies. The institutional 
environment significantly affects the costs and challenges of entering and doing business in a 
country. The entry ticket can be substantial in certain countries as a result of particular laws, 
regulations, political uncertainty, culture, norms etc. 
A thorough understanding of the institutional environment and its corresponding costs and 
challenges, allow for an informed decision about whether the market potential – the upside – 
still justifies market entry, or whether other countries render more attractive due to a lower 
institutional burden, and whether the firm has the resources required to actually get in position 
to tap the market potential. Thus, firms should deliberately evaluate and map the institutional 
context of potential countries, certainly in the case of emerging markets, but also on a general 
basis as part of a country screening process. Such measures can prevent firms from incorrectly 
deciding to enter a particular market, but it can also potentially reveal markets that otherwise 
would have been overlooked, which prove attractive due to particularly favorable institutional 
conditions. In doing this, firms can make use of national support organizations, which may 
have a branch in the particular country, local consultancies specializing in market entry for 
foreign firms and global organization such as The World Bank, International Monetary Fund, 
Transparency International and Global Property Guide, which all publish information and 
statistics about most countries in the world. 
Gain initial income before committing – balance spending with income as you go 
This is obviously easier said than done, but holding back a little bit before committing to 
market entry, trying to secure an initial income to support costs and investments, and then 
gradually expanding as income increases, can contribute to a sustainable and successful 
market entry, particularly where the institutional environment holds both challenges and 
surprises, as is often the case in emerging economies. Moreover, having a flexible and 
scalable mindset, spending and investing according to the realistic near future business level 
rather than predetermined and rigid company policies, can further limit the risks undertaken 
along the way. 
This entails having a long-term mindset, but at the same time being patient and taking the 
time to grow the foreign establishment according to the growth of the business, instead of 
immediately boosting up the establishment expecting that sales will follow. In emerging 
markets, due to deficiencies and friction in the institutional environment, the milestones of the 
market entry process are often more uncertain and things often take a longer time and 
ultimately end up being more expensive than expected. Proceeding carefully and flexibly, but 
at the same time decisively and robustly may be a powerful balance when entering countries 
where the institutional context is less familiar, less stable or less market-supporting 
Don’t forget to manage what you cannot see  
Managing what you cannot see is not an easy task. The institutional context does not only 
include the formal “rules of the game”. It also includes what you cannot see, namely the 
culture, the values, the norms and the shared understandings of the people i.e. the informal 
institutions. Ultimately people are one’s employees, one’s customers, one’s business partners 
and one’s regulators. Just like formal institutions, these informal institutions are critical in 
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facilitating or obstructing business. They are particularly powerful in defining what is 
legitimate within a country, and thereby constraining the behavior of firms in the market. 
This study exemplified the deliberate use of business culture to exert control over one’s 
foreign subsidiary. By understanding the differences in informal institutions, such as business 
culture, between one’s home country and the host country, one can deliberately assess the 
need to reinforce the business culture of the parent company within the foreign subsidiary. 
Such reinforcement can be achieved by the use of parent company expatriates. By installing 
someone in the management of the foreign subsidiary who has the same business culture as 
the parent company, one increases the likelihood of decisions being made in accordance with 
the strategy, the policy and the ethics of the parent company.  
Going to Brazil? Learn samba or stay home 
When the decision to enter Brazil has been made, it is time to put on the dancing shoes and 
learn samba. It is all or nothing in Brazil. 
Brazil is a country characterized by a high degree of protectionism. This is evident in both 
formal and informal institutions. On the formal side it is expressed through strict local content 
regulations and complex, time-consuming and expensive import and export taxes and 
procedures. All this makes it very difficult to be successful in Brazil without a strong local 
presence. On the informal side, the protectionism and preference for local businesses is rooted 
in the culture and values of the people, who ultimately constitute one’s employees, customers, 
business partners and regulators. All of which demand that entrant firms establish a serious 
and long-term local presence. Skilled workers, which are scarce resources in the Brazilian 
petroleum industry, want to work for such an employer, and customers, largely Petrobras, will 
almost exclusively work with firms that demonstrate such traits. With few exceptions, one 
cannot merely rely on superior technology or a good price in Brazil, one needs to compete on 
the basis of local presence as well. 
Establishing a local presence in Brazil is expensive and time- and energy-consuming, but 
investing the effort to do so may still be rewarding. Brazil is a large, but rather isolated 
market. This means that the market positions and market shares in the global market are of 
less importance here. The supplier relationships of the operators are also less established and 
rigid. Thus from the perspective of an oil service company previously targeting the North Sea, 
if it invests the extra effort, the potential market position and market share achievable in the 
Brazilian market may be less limited than in other international offshore markets. So, if you 
are serious about Brazil, “learn samba” and establish a local presence, for even in isolation the 
Brazilian offshore market is vast. If you are not willing to make the extra effort, you might as 
well focus your attention elsewhere, because there seems to be no “remote control” that works 
for the Brazilian market. 
6.4 Implications for policy makers 
Focusing on the influence of host country institutions on the market entry process, this study 
reveals implications also for policy makers. 
Don’t miss out on the “best” foreign firms 
Strict regulations may shift or change the basis on which firms compete in the market. In the 
case of local content in Brazil, firms found that competition was based on local content 
conformity rather than price or quality. This may reduce the efficiency of the market, as the 
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“best” companies are not necessarily chosen. The market mechanism is a powerful tool to 
achieve efficiency, and interfering with it in this was may be unfortunate for the country in the 
long-term. Ultimately, this may lead to the use of suboptimal solutions. Perhaps the “best” 
companies, those who succeed in other markets because of their superior technology, steer 
away from heavily regulated markets because they have many options i.e. they can go 
elsewhere and succeed. In this way, heavily regulated markets may miss out on the “best” 
players. 
Emphasize support programs with context-specific knowledge 
Given the significance of the institutional context with respect to foreign market entry, policy 
makers should emphasize the use of support programs and organizations in educating and 
assisting firms in understanding, evaluating and mapping out the institutional context of the 
host country. Such support programs and organizations should be sufficiently local in the 
foreign market to truly know the particularities of the formal and informal institutions. The 
latter is especially difficult to fully understand by reading or conversation, but often needs to 
be experienced, which require the employees of the support programs and organizations to be 
experienced in the local country-market. It is important that policy makers are aware of and 
base their efforts on the insight that context-specific knowledge perhaps is the most important 
thing that government support programs and organizations can offer firms going abroad. 
6.5 Limitations of this study and directions for future research 
This study addresses the general research question of how the differing institutional contexts 
of developed and emerging economies affect firms’ foreign market entry strategies through a 
case study focused on the Norwegian oil service industry and the foreign market contexts of 
Australia and Brazil. Thus, the specific domain from which the cases are drawn is in itself 
relevant, but the findings can of course not be claimed valid for all firms and all developed 
and emerging markets. There are obvious particularities of the oil service industry, such as 
high technology level, customized and specialized deliveries, large contract sizes and large 
customers. Furthermore, even though the host countries examined in this study, Australia and 
Brazil, demonstrated many of the traits expected from developed and emerging economies as 
described in the Theoretical background of this thesis, there are obvious particularities to 
these countries and they are by no means perfect representatives of developed and emerging 
economies, respectively. Future research need to address this question in other industries and 
countries. 
As mentioned in the limitations of scope in the introduction to this thesis, the study does not 
distinguish between different sizes of firms, such as SMEs and MNCs. Future research should 
investigate how the findings relate to different firm sizes. 
The approach taken in this study, by examining entry by the same firms into different 
institutional contexts, has to the best of the author’s knowledge not been taken by any prior 
research within the field. This approach has in this study been explored, developed and 
demonstrated to be suitable for the purpose of investigating the influence of host country 
institutions on entry strategies. Future research should further explore, employ and develop 
this approach. 
The main focus of this study is the institutional theory perspective on foreign market entry 
strategy. It is however not claimed that entry strategies are fully determined by institutions. 
On the contrary, it is acknowledged that for example transaction-cost and resource-based 
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factors also affect entry strategies. These perspectives are briefly presented and included in 
this study, but the main focus remains the institutional perspective. Future research should 
strive to employ a multi-theoretical perspective in which the dominant perspectives are 
equally included. 
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7 Conclusions 
In order to derive the conclusions of this study, we return to the research question developed 
at the outset: 
How do the differing institutional contexts of developed and emerging economies 
affect the market entry strategies of Norwegian firms? 
The study addresses this question through a case study of four Norwegian oil service firms 
with market entry experience from Australia and Brazil – one developed and one emerging 
economy. By investigating the differences between the entry strategies in the two countries, 
the study examines how the entry strategies are affected by the differing institutional contexts. 
As predicted by the theoretical differences between developed and emerging economies, the 
findings indicate significant differences between the institutional contexts of Australia and 
Brazil. Formal institutions such as laws, regulations and political systems are considered less 
familiar, more uncertain and less market-supporting in Brazil than in Australia. In addition, 
informal institutions such as values and culture are considered more different from those in 
Norway – a developed economy. In Brazil, local content regulations, bureaucracy, political 
uncertainty and a fundamental protectionist sentiment among the people are institutional 
aspects that are found to significantly affect foreign market entry strategies. In the developed 
economy Australia on the other hand, the institutional context is considered familiar, stable 
and market-supporting, and entrant firms very limitedly adapt their entry strategies due to the 
institutional context. The study thus concludes that foreign market entry strategies are affected 
by the institutional context of the host country and its level of development. Moreover, entry 
strategies are found to be more significantly affected by institutions in emerging economies. 
The aspects of foreign market entry strategy considered in this study are (1) the rationale for 
market selection, (2) the choice of entry mode and (3) staffing and establishing foreign 
operations. Firms’ rationale for market selection is driven by factors such as market potential 
and the fit between firm resources and market characteristics, but formal institutional aspects 
such as regulations and political uncertainty are found to strongly affect the final decision of 
whether or not to enter. The choice between the generic entry modes is similarly not driven by 
institutional considerations, rather by a desire for proximity to customers, the nature of the 
business and the size of foreign operations. However, the ultimate level of local presence and 
resource commitment in the foreign market are found to be strongly affected by institutional 
pressures, as both formal regulations and informal expectations in the emerging market Brazil 
demand a heavier local presence from entrant firms. Thus, in summary the institutional 
context is found to affect entry strategies, not in isolation, but in interplay with other factors. 
The institutional context is nonetheless found to strongly affect the final outcome of strategic 
decisions, particularly in emerging economies. 
In the staffing and establishment phase, the total costs and the time it takes to enter foreign 
markets are found to be significantly increased by bureaucracy and more complex “rules of 
the game” in the emerging market Brazil. There is also a greater need for controlling the 
business culture of the subsidiary through the use of expatriates. In total, the emerging market 
Brazil is found to be more challenging to enter, largely due to both formal and informal 
requirements of the institutional context. The findings indicate that the single, most clear, 
advice for entering the Brazilian market is to employ an all-or-nothing approach to achieve 
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the necessary local presence. The findings further indicate that firms that deliberately take the 
institutional dimension into account when entering foreign markets are more likely to enter 
successfully, particularly in emerging markets.  
For researchers these findings support the notion that institutions cannot be disregarded when 
studying foreign market entry strategies, rather, a multi-theoretical approach is needed. For 
managers, the findings imply that firms must explicitly and deliberately consider the 
institutional context when entering foreign markets in order to make an informed decision 
about whether or not to enter and to appropriately adapt their entry strategies. 
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Appendix 
 
Interview guide for Norwegian parent firm 
This interview guide includes key questions and is intended to guide a semi-structured and 
open-ended interview. The purpose of the interview is however to listen to the stories and 
experiences of the interviewee, who is encouraged to speak freely and emphasize those 
aspects considered most important to the market entry process. 
Introduction 
This study focuses on how the market entry process is affected by the foreign country’s 
institutional environment. The institutional environment constitutes the formal and informal 
“rules of the game”. Formal institutions are laws, regulations, politics etc., while informal 
institutions are traditions, norms, values, culture, language etc. 
Background information 
- Brief firm history 
- Describe the product/service range and business units 
- Describe the firm’s international experience and share of foreign sales 
o Describe the history, scale and scope of operations in Australia and Brazil 
Rationale for market selection 
- What were the main motives for market entry into Australia and Brazil? Sales, 
production/sourcing or both? 
- How did the firm compare the attractiveness of these two markets? Why? 
o What factors were considered in assessing the attractiveness of the markets 
(size, growth, institutional environment etc.)? 
- How did the firm compare these two markets in terms of the challenges to market 
entry? 
o What were perceived to be the major differences? 
Choice of Entry Mode 
- How did the two markets compare in terms of initial entry modes (direct export, sales 
agent, licensing, franchising, joint venture, acquisition, greenfield subsidiary) 
considered? 
- How did the initial entry mode (direct export, sales agent, licensing, franchising, joint 
venture, acquisition, greenfield subsidiary) differ between these two markets? Why? 
o In what way can this difference in mode choice be explained by the difference 
in formal (laws, regulations etc.) and informal (norms, culture etc.) 
institutional environments between Australia and Brazil?  
- How has the entry modes changed? Why? 
Staffing and establishing foreign operations  
- How does the foreign organization design differ between these two markets? Why? 
o How does the distribution of expats and local employees differ at different 
levels? Why? 
- How do the activities carried out by the subsidiary differ between the two markets? 
Why? 
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- What were the major differences between the two markets in terms of staffing and 
establishing operations?  
- Does the firm assess different risks regarding protection of intellectual property in the 
two markets? Why? 
o How is this managed in the two markets? 
- Has the establishment phase taken a longer time in either of the two countries? Why? 
o In what way can this difference be explained by the difference in formal (laws, 
regulations etc.) and informal (norms, culture etc.) institutional environments 
between Australia and Brazil? 
- Has the establishment phase been more expensive in either of the two countries? 
Why? 
o In what way can this difference be explained by the difference in formal (laws, 
regulations etc.) and informal (norms, culture etc.) institutional environments 
between Australia and Brazil? 
Perceived successfulness of market entry  
- To what degree has the overall objectives for market entry been achieved in each 
market? 
- In total, which of these two markets was the most challenging to enter? Why? 
o In what way can this difference be explained by the difference in formal (laws, 
regulations etc.) and informal (norms, culture etc.) institutional environments 
between Australia and Brazil? 
- Has the market entry process in total been more or less challenging than expected in 
each of the two countries? 
- Compared to expectations, how profitable have the operations in each of these two 
countries been?  
  
79 
 
Interview guide for foreign subsidiary 
This interview guide includes key questions and is intended to guide a semi-structured and 
open-ended interview. The purpose of the interview is however to listen to the stories and 
experiences from the market entry process, and the interviewee is encouraged to speak freely 
and emphasize those aspects considered most important. 
Introduction 
This study focuses on how the market entry process is affected by the foreign country’s 
institutional environment. The institutional environment constitutes the formal and informal 
“rules of the game”. In other words, formal institutions are laws, regulations, politics etc., 
while informal institutions are traditions, norms, values, culture, language etc. 
Background information 
- Brief firm history 
- Describe the product/service range 
- Describe the firm’s international experience and share of foreign sales 
Rationale for market selection 
- What was the main motive for market entry into Australia/Brazil? Sales, 
production/sourcing or both? 
- How did the firm come to consider entering this market? 
- What factors were considered in assessing the attractiveness of the market (size, 
growth, institutional environment etc.)? 
o In what way were aspects of the Australia’s/Brazil’s formal institutional 
environment (regulations, property rights, bureaucracy, political issues etc.) 
considered? 
o In what way were aspects of the Australia’s/Brazil’s informal institutional 
environment (norms, values, culture, language etc.) considered? 
- How challenging was this market entry process expected to be? 
o What were considered as the major challenges? 
Choice of Entry Mode 
- Which entry modes (direct export, sales agent, licensing, franchising, joint venture, 
acquisition, greenfield subsidiary) were initially considered and why? 
- Which entry mode was initially selected and why? 
o In what way was this choice affected by Australia’s/Brazil’s formal (laws, 
regulations etc.) and informal (norms, culture etc.) institutional environment?  
- Has the entry mode changed since? If so, why?  
o In what way was this change affected by Australia’s/Brazil’s formal (laws, 
regulations etc.) and informal (norms, culture etc.) institutional environment?  
Staffing and establishing foreign operations  
- Describe the foreign organization design  
o How is the distribution of expats to local employees at different levels? Why? 
- Describe the activities carries out by the foreign subsidiary 
- What were the major challenges of staffing and establishing business operations? 
- Has the establishment phase taken a longer time than expected? 
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o Why? In what way is this affected by Australia’s/Brazil’s institutional 
environment? 
- Has the establishment phase been more expensive than expected?  
o Why? In what way is this affected by Australia’s/ Brazil’s institutional 
environment? 
Perceived successfulness of market entry  
- To what degree has the overall objectives for market entry been achieved? 
- What have been the major challenges to market entry? 
- Has the market entry process in total been more or less challenging than expected? 
o Why? In what way is this affected by Australia’s/Brazil’s institutional 
environment? 
- Compared to expectations, how profitable are the operations in Australia/Brazil? 
o Why? In what way is this affected by Australia’s/Brazil’s institutional 
environment?  
81 
 
Interview guide for industry expert 
This interview guide includes key questions and is intended to guide a semi-structured and 
open-ended interview. The purpose of the interview is however to listen to the stories and 
experiences of the interviewee, who is encouraged to speak freely and emphasize those 
aspects considered most important. 
Introduction 
This study focuses on how the market entry process is affected by the foreign country’s 
institutional environment. The institutional environment constitutes the formal and informal 
“rules of the game”. Formal institutions are laws, regulations, politics etc., while informal 
institutions are traditions, norms, values, culture, language etc. The firms considered are 
Norwegian oil service companies and the aspects of the market entry process considered are 
(1) rationale for market selection, (2) choice of entry mode, (3) staffing and establishing 
foreign operations and (4) perceived successfulness of market entry. 
Background information 
- Please describe your experience with market entry processes of Norwegian oil service 
companies in Australia and Brazil 
Rationale for market selection 
- What are usually the main motives for entering Australia and Brazil? 
- What factors are commonly considered in assessing the attractiveness of these markets 
(size, growth, institutional environment etc.)? 
o To what degree do firms take formal or informal institutions into account at 
this stage? 
- What are considered the major challenges of entering these two markets? 
Choice of Entry Mode 
- How do firms most commonly reason when selecting what entry modes (direct export, 
sales agent, licensing, franchising, joint venture, acquisition, greenfield subsidiary) to 
serve these two markets with?  
- In what way are the firms’ reasoning for and choice of entry mode affected by the 
formal and informal institutions of Australia and Brazil? 
Staffing and establishing foreign operations 
- What are considered the major challenges to staffing and establishing foreign 
operations in Australia and Brazil? 
o What challenges are posed by formal and informal institutions? 
- Do firms reason differently regarding the employment of expats as opposed to local 
employees in these two countries? Why? 
- Are there differences in the time spent and costs incurred in establishing operations in 
these two countries? Why? 
Perceived successfulness of market entry  
- Overall, which of these two markets is the most challenging to enter? Why? 
o In what way can this difference be explained by the difference in formal and 
informal institutions between Australia and Brazil? 
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- From your experience, have companies in general been more successful with market 
entry in either of these two countries? Why? 
 
